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INTRODUCTION
The current debate over eminent domain as a tool to
facilitate economic development shifts between two starkly
unattractive alternatives. Property rights advocates insist that if
strict limitations are not placed on the ability of governments to
condemn private property and transfer it to private parties, then
homes, small businesses, and entire communities face capricious
annihilation by state and local politicians and their well-heeled
patrons.' Their slogan "a man's home is his castle" expresses the
inviolability of all private property rights as the fundamental
1 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *25-26, Kelo v. City of New London,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2004) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 1659558; Castle Coalition-About Us,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/profile/index.html (describing the need of home and
small business owners to stand up to "greedy governments and developers who seek
to use eminent domain to take private property for their own gain.") (last visited
Sept. 16, 2006).
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check on authoritarianism. 2 Defenders of local governments, on
the other hand, warn that elimination of eminent domain as an
effective redevelopment tool will isolate older communities by
thwarting any efforts to coordinate investment.3 In their view,
the mobility of residents and businesses forces local jurisdictions
to act as entrepreneurial as Fortune 500 companies in their
recruitment and retention of taxpayers. 4
Both views speak to the survival of urban neighborhoods, but
neither offers a paradigm of land ownership that fosters
authentic community development. The social and economic
health of an urban neighborhood necessitates a certain amount of
collective action that reflects both the interdependence of its
stakeholders and its symbiosis with other parts of the region. 5
Residents' contributions to their own homes and to the
community at large are secured by their private ownership of
those investments, and ultimately by their uninhibited choice to
remain part of or exit from those communities. 6 For reflective
community advocates then, the conceptual dichotomy of the
neighborhood as either a confederacy of castles or an expendable
division of a municipal corporation fails to offer a satisfactory
model for true community development.
By a 5-4 margin, the Supreme Court recently upheld the
exercise of eminent domain at issue in Kelo v. City of New
London,7 dashing the hopes of many private property rights
advocates for a revival of the federal public use restriction. The
2 See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 140-41 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992)
(expressing strong support for the notion that property rights are an essential aspect
of personal liberty and quoting Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552
(1972)).
3 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore in
Support of Respondents at *24-25, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166940 (arguing that residents of East Baltimore
'have been isolated for decades from opportunities for meaningful employment and
economic advancement"). For a discussion of eminent domain's role in coordinating
intensive investment in deteriorating neighborhoods, see infra Part I.C.2.
4 See Patricia E. Salkin & Lora A. Lucero, Community Redevelopment, Public
Use, and Eminent Domain, 37 URB. LAW. 201, 208-09 (2005) (quoting AM. PLANNING
ASS'N, POLICY GUIDE ON PUBLIC REDEVELOPMENT (2004), http://www.planning.org/
policyguides/pdflRedevelopment.pdf).
5 See, e.g., id. at 226 n.194 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2005)).
6 See generally ELY, supra note 2, at 43 (explaining that "the doctrine that
property ownership was essential for the enjoyment of liberty has long been a
fundamental tenet of Anglo-American constitutional thought").
7 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668-69 (2005).
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political backlash against that decision, however, has spawned a
swarm of federal and state legislative initiatives to curtail
condemnation for transfer to private parties.8  As the Kelo
opinion itself implied, protection of condemnees against undue
hardship should come from the States' enactment and application
of their own statutes and constitutions. 9 Unfortunately, many of
the bills currently pending amount to little more than ham-
handed attempts to overrule Kelo legislatively. 10 Legislatures
can be more proactive, precise, and comprehensive than courts in
their legal pronouncements." Statutory acts can balance the
legitimate public needs for land acquisition against "the hardship
that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of
just compensation."12 Drafting appropriate statutory solutions,
however, requires a thorough understanding of the common
principles of market liquidity that underlie both the condemnor's
insistence on compulsory transfer and the condemnee's assertion
of irreparable harm.
In theoretical terms, eminent domain is the government's
assertion that all private property rule entitlements must yield
to liability rule liquidation in the face of public need.13 The
8 Thirty state legislatures have enacted further restrictions on eminent domain
since the rendering of the Kelo decision. Legislative Action Since Kelo,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf (last
visited Sept. 15, 2006). Even those closest to the movement against eminent domain
abuse have questioned its substantive gains in this arena. See e.g., Timothy
Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent Domain
Reform?, 9 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
Isol3/Papers.cfm?abstractid=868539 (asserting that more than half of the laws
enacted provide little or no meaningful protection for private property owners).
9 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
10 See Patricia E. Salkin & Margaret Lavery, Zoning and Land Use Planning,
34 REAL EST. L.J. 375, 375-76 (2005).
11 Frank Michelman concluded his classic article, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, with a
discussion of why legislative reforms are needed to address the problem of just
compensation for governmental action that impact private property rights. 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1253-58 (1967). Because any sophisticated systematic resolution of
eminent domain controversies requires a greater remedial menu than the judicial
dichotomy of property rule negative injunction or liability rule damages award, it is
this Article's contention that legal theory will tend to generate nuanced solutions
that presuppose legislative enactment. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying
text.
12 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
13 The terminology of property rules and liability rules originates with a classic
law review article commonly referenced as "The Cathedral." Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
[Vol. 80:923926
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condemning authority's use of condemnation makes sense when
the public goal, by its nature, involves the placement of land into
a public trust. On the other hand, when a public objective can be
satisfied by less coercive means, it is the liability rule of
compensated compulsory transfer that may need to give way. In
such situations, a more robust understanding of the just
compensation requirement would move beyond computation of
cash awards and shape the way in which government achieves
public objectives when condemnation would cause irreparable
harm. 14  Courts and legislatures evaluating and fixing the
property rule/liability rule boundary for land rights as against
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972) (discussing when property
rules give way to liability rules in the context of the exercise of eminent domain). In
their article entitled Pliability Rules, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky offer
a concise description of the range of entitlement alternatives:
In analyzing how the law protects entitlements, Calabresi and Melamed
divided the universe of legal remedies into three modalities of protection:
property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules. They defined the
three modalities as follows. Property rule protection confers upon the
entitlement holder the exclusive power to determine the price nonholders
would have to pay for using the protected asset or right. Thus, all transfers
of entitlements protected by a property rule must be consensual; all
attempts to transfer the entitlement nonconsensually would be met with an
injunction. Liability rule protection, by contrast, gives the nonholder the
power to take the entitlement without the consent of the entitlement holder
and pay a price to be determined by a third party, typically a court or the
legislature. The entitlement holder would not be able to enjoin third parties
from taking her entitlement; instead, she would have to settle for damages.
Finally, inalienability rules bar all transfers of the entitlement, whether
consensual or nonconsensual.
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2002)
(citations omitted).
14 See infra Part I.A.2. Substantive due process bars unnecessary takings of
fundamental rights not only because their free exercise is essential to a functioning
democracy, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) ("[T]he Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' ") (quoting Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))), but also because their loss is
incompensable. See id. at 726 (discussing the "[Supreme] Court's substantive-due-
process tradition of interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect certain
fundamental rights" many of which "involv[e] the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime") (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))). Although
substantive due process does not bar the condemnation of homeownership property,
residents who face the loss of community, their investment in which is crucial to
social capital, should not have to rely on public use jurisprudence alone to protect
them from liquidation. See infra Part I.A.2.
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the government must look not only to the public need for eminent
domain but also to the nature of the loss imposed on condemnees.
In the context of urban redevelopment of owner-occupied
residential land, the government's need to intervene in the real
estate market must contend with the homeowners' inability to
enter into the market and fully replace what was taken. To
illustrate both why and how urban redevelopment of homeowner
property can and should be transformed, this Article will take
advantage of recent legal scholarship by Abraham Bell and
Gideon Parchomovsky breaking down the boundaries between
property and liability rules,15 and articulating a theory of
property rooted in the value of stable ownership. 16
To many homeowners deprived of both residence and
community, no cash award can qualify as "just compensation."'17
When the government enjoys a thick market to meet its public
objective, it should not drive condemnees into a thin, or non-
existent market to try to replace what they would lose in the
taking. Rather than submit redevelopment plans, however, to
the property rule veto of every single homeowner,' 8 a community
15 For a comprehensive treatment of these conceptual boundary issues, see Bell
& Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 4-5. For two interesting pliability rule responses
to the eminent domain dilemma, see Michael A. Heller & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Art of Land Assembly (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with author), available
at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop-papers/Heller.pdf, and Lee Anne
Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 1003 (2004),
both of which offer collective and individual mechanisms for increasing condemnee
autonomy in eminent domain's traditional liability rule approach. For a discussion of
each of these proposals, see infra Part I.C.3.
16 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 615 (2005). Bell and Parchomovsky point out the importance
of combining property-rule and liability-rule approaches in compensating the
condemnee for the part of his or her loss not covered by the receipt of market value.
See id. at 604-05. They also acknowledge the debt that their approach to
subjectively valued property owes to Peggy Radin's theory of property and
personhood. See id. at 542. But see id. at 550-51 (attempting to distance themselves
from Radin's labor intensive analysis of particular subject-object relationships). For
insight into Radin's influence, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) (explaining that personhood "serve[s] as an explicit
source of values for making moral distinctions in property disputes"). In setting out
broad categories for condemnee compensability, the current Article will draw upon
these theoretical resources to fashion an argument for communal homestead
protection against urban redevelopment eminent domain. See infra Part I.C.4.
17 See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1097, 1111-12 (1981) (exploring cases where no amount of money could
compensate the aggrieved owner for his or her injuries).
18 For a discussion of the stagnation that can be induced by overlapping
928 [Vol. 80:923
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governance model should be enacted to transcend the property
rule/liability rule dilemma.
I propose a pair of legislative reforms that offer a productive,
if not placid, interface between community stakeholders and the
governmental authorities responsible for development planning.
Residents of a distressed urban neighborhood should be
empowered both to assert rights of continuing residency that
cannot be liquidated through redevelopment eminent domain
processes and, through the pooling and exchange of such rights,
to shape collectively any redevelopment of their community.
Specifically, community members' legal rights of long-term
residency in their current homes should not be subject to eminent
domain pursuant to a required redevelopment plan until the
majority of them have approved the plan.19 Through this
Homestead Community Consent ("HCC"), these residents, as a
group, will be offering their homes for sale in exchange for a plan
that will truly improve their community. To solidify the
ownership of the redevelopment by these homestead residents
and other inhabitants who have actual, if not legally protected,
long-term residencies in the neighborhood, continued
membership in the community should be assured by amending
relocation laws to guarantee these core community members an
alienable Community Residency Entitlement ("CRE") to
replacement housing in the redeveloped district. 20 With the
property rule entitlements, see Mark D. West & Emily M. Morris, The Tragedy of the
Condominiums: Legal Responses to Collective Action Problems After the Kobe
Earthquake, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 903, 904 (2003) (noting that in common interest
communities, "rights of exclusion become distributed among so many owners that it
becomes too difficult to agree to develop the property to a higher use"); Michael
Heller, Empty Moscow Stores: A Cautionary Tale for Property Innovators, in
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 189-90
(Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker, eds., 2000) (discussing problems that arise "[wihen
too many owners have ... rights of use").
19 Statutory changes to the planning requirements already present in many
state laws delegating condemnation authority to the public authorities responsible
for so-called "public-private takings" could augment collective condemnee autonomy.
Examples of such statutory provisions are found in many states: CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7-600, 7-603 (1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4-2, 8-4-4 (2006); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 99.820 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-504 (2006); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1709
(2003). For a discussion of the Homestead Community Consent Reform, see infra
Part II.B.
20 The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Properties Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970 already offers protection of residents' rights to remain in the same
metropolitan area. 42 U.S.C. § 4626 (2000). In guaranteeing residents the right to
return to the redeveloped neighborhood, the proposed reform would substantially
2006]
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enactment of both reforms, resident homeowners would
collectively control their rights to sell their individual homes in
order to improve their community, and each resident would have
personal control over his or her right to remain a member of that
community after redevelopment. Together, these two
participatory processes can convert an instrument of societal
infamy into an opportunity for community transformation and
healthy reconnection with the surrounding market.
The first part of the Article will discuss the current
constraints on eminent domain generally and construct a theory
that maps out public necessity and just compensation as
complementary limitations on eminent domain that flow from the
market limitations facing the condemnor and condemnee,
respectively. A broad understanding of "public use" can work
with a more robust reading of "just compensation" to constrain
eminent domain as against homeowners without depriving them
of the tools they need to redevelop their neighborhoods. The
second part of the Article examines the details of Homestead
Community Consent and Community Residency Entitlements as
respective reforms on state planning requirements and federal
relocation law.
I. THE SOCIOECONOMICS OF JUST COMPENSATION
Eminent domain banishes all pure property rule
entitlements to the realm of the hypothetical. 21 The image of an
obstinate owner of a particularly indispensable piece of private
property whimsically frustrating the satisfaction of a public need
undercuts all claims for the sanctity of in-kind entitlements.
Private property advocates have responded to the inevitability of
eminent domain authority by insisting that such governmental
liquidation be limited to cases of genuine "public use."22
A judicial review of a public use determination offers a
homeowner condemnee only two outcomes: the home is
inviolable and can only be obtained with the owner's consent, or
constrict the geographical area that could provide qualified permanent relocation
sites for those displaced long-term residents of certain projects that use federal
funds and eminent domain. See infra Part II.B.2.
21 All private property is subject to eminent domain. IA NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 3.02 (3d. ed. 2006).
22 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 166-69 (Harvard Univ. Press 1985) (articulating the public use
limitation in terms of a restrictive notion of public goods).
[Vol. 80:923
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the home is gone and the cash value it has for others takes its
place. The stark difference between property rule and liability
rule, between protective injunction and compensatory damages,
seemingly affords no middle ground. In the case of eminent
domain, courts make the choice with no reference to landowners'
varying experiences of the loss inflicted by condemnation. 23
Legal theorists, however, have recognized hybrid forms of
ownership and dubbed them pliability rule entitlements. 24 Some
have sought to combine features of property and liability rules to
offer fair and efficient resolutions to issues such as eminent
domain. 25  Pliability rule proponents engineer entitlement
protections that offer valuation alternatives to the liability rule
approach of judicial appraisal without inflicting the holdout
problems and other transaction cost issues associated with
property rule entitlements. 26 To reinforce individual autonomy
without enabling exaggerated claims of subjective value, Lee
Anne Fennell has proposed systems of "revealing options."27 In
their approach to the eminent domain question, Michael Heller
and Rick Hills have softened the express consent element of
property rule entitlements through collective bargaining.28
Although these two approaches differ substantially, they
both are sufficiently innovative and complex as to require
legislative creation. Courts applying crucial constitutional
phrases may not be the only, or even the best, means of
23 See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324, 326
(1893) (explaining that the computation of compensation only concerns the value of
the land and does not concern the owner's personal loss).
24 See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 5 (describing pliability
rules as being more flexible than liability and property rules).
25 See Fennell, supra note 15, at 1002-03; Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 3;
discussion infra Part I.C.3 (providing a proposed pliability rule approach to
neighborhood eminent domain).
26 Bell and Parchomovsky apply the "pliability" terminology that they created to
a wide variety of entitlements that mix property and liability rule features across
time or with respect to various non-owners. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13 at
25-26. This Article's focus will be on those types of pliability rules that manifest
both property and liability rule features at the same time with respect to the same
set of non-owners.
27 See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1401-02
(2005) (suggesting that the problem of subjective valuations can be improved by
requiring property owners to preset prices for potential entitlements to their land);
supra note 15 and accompanying text and discussion infra Part I.C.3.
28 See Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 1-2, 5 (arguing that the community of
property owners should decide by consensus whether or not urban renewal is
appropriate); discussion infra Part I.C.3.
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determining how compensability should restrain eminent
domain. 29  Nevertheless, a richer understanding of the
fundamental limits of eminent domain will lead to helpful
solutions, even if the courts are ultimately dependent upon the
legislature to implement these limits. 30
A. Legal and Equitable Constraints on Eminent Domain
Although popularly described as an express grant of
constitutional authority, 31 the governmental power to compel
transfer of private property for its own needs is, as a matter of
law, an indispensable and implicit aspect of sovereignty. 32
Eminent domain's historical roots predate any modern notion of
governmental authority as flowing from the consent of the
governed. It has never depended upon constitutional text for
fundamental legitimacy. 33 The principle that, at the need of the
sovereign, dominion shall become usufruct has survived the
spread of democracy with largely the same limitations of public
29 See Michelman, supra note 11, at 1165-69 (questioning the reliance on
judicial interpretations of what amounts to "compensation" and emphasizing that
the government should determine how "compensation" should be computed and
distributed among society).
30 While it might seem bizarre to suggest that legislatures should be counted
upon to restrict themselves as to which takings go "too far," this Article's proposals
for eminent domain reform are not merely pleas for self-regulation. Most
controversial condemnations are carried out by local and regional authorities that
receive specifically delegated eminent authority from state governments. See supra
note 19 (giving examples of statutes delegating the authority to condemn property to
local authorities). Federal and state legislatures are currently considering a range of
bills to limit, respectively, the funding and authority of local authorities to condemn
private property for economic development. See Legislative Action Since Kelo, supra
note 8.
31 News media discussions of condemnations reflect the public's lack of comfort
with the idea that eminent domain is an implicit aspect of sovereignty. A recent New
York Times article credits the Takings Clause itself as the source of eminent domain
authority: "The issue is not whether governments can condemn private property to
build a public amenity like a road, a school or a sewage treatment plant. That power
is explicit in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, provided that 'just
compensation' is paid." John M. Broder, States Curbing Right To Seize Private
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al.
32 See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946) (explaining the
government's "federal sovereign power" to appropriate land for "public use").
33 See generally 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.13 (2006) (tracing the
origins of the term "eminent domain"). Although the earliest discussions of eminent
domain are found in Grotius and Puffendorf, its use in English common law predates
even those references. See Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original
Understanding of the So-Called 'Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1258,
1258 n.40 (2001-2002) (stating that the term "eminent domain" predates Grotius).
[Vol. 80:923
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necessity and just compensation it has had from its original
articulation. 34
Although eminent domain activity is often carried out by the
executive branch, the power to condemn land is vested in the
legislature.36 To take land for public use requires the enactment
of a law.36 That being said, the legislature has broad latitude to
delegate its authority. 37  While state governments have the
ability to vest plenary eminent domain in these local and
regional authorities, they typically place significant substantive
and procedural restrictions on their capacity to seize land. 38 As
these quasi-public corporations are responsible for the most
controversial condemnations, a complete legal theory of eminent
domain will guide legislatures in structuring the planning
processes through which these organizations act.
Such an understanding of eminent domain will center on the
two classic restrictions on that power: Public Use and Just
Compensation. 39 The ends of a compulsory transfer must be
public, and the imposed costs, though at first private, must
become public as well. While discussion of the latter requirement
fills treatises with subsections on the scope and method of land
valuation, public use jurisprudence has evolved more simply, if
not more quietly, at the highest levels of the judiciary.
1. Public Use: The Limitation That Was
Although academic obituaries for the "public use"
requirement have mounted over the last fifty years,40 its decline
34 See Harrington, supra note 33, at 1247-48 (noting that American political
theorists drew upon English legal traditions by naming legislative consent as the
sole limit on the government's power of eminent domain).
35 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952)
(discussing the application of the separation of powers to the Takings Clause).
36 See id. at 585, 587 (stressing that the power to condemn land must stem from
the Constitution even during wartime emergencies).
37 See id. at 588.
38 See City of Tacoma v. Zimmerman, 82 P.3d 701, 704-05 n.6 (Wash. App. Div.
2004) (citing the relevant state statute, which limits cities' powers of eminent
domain). See generally N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (stating that condemnation of
blighted areas is subject to various conditions and governmental regulations); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 31-25-102 et seq. (detailing the relevant definitions and procedural
steps for condemnation based on urban renewal).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment ends with the clause "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
40 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 n.5
(Yale Univ. Press 1977) (reexamining the idea that "any state purpose otherwise
2006]
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was not straight downward from its original enactment.41 Prior
to the civil war, state courts showed great deference to
legislatures' determinations that certain transfers to private
parties constituted valid exercises of eminent domain.42 In the
nineteenth century the creation of an infrastructure for a
growing national economy intensified the taking of land for
canals, private mills and railroads. 43 The growing frequency of
condemnations for transfer to private parties alarmed many
judges. 44 Courts used both the takings clause and the evolving
notion of "substantive due process" to reign in legislators' ability
to interfere with vested economic rights.45 By the time the
Supreme Court marked the high point of substantive due process
protection of economic interests with its decision in Lochner v.
New York, 46 the restrictive understanding of "public use" was
constitutional" should pass the "public use" limitation); EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at
161 (characterizing the "public use" clause as "invisible"); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61-64 (1986) (noting that observers
view the public use clause as a "dead letter" and discussing three cases which
support that view); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An
Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 599 (1949) (documenting the "death" of the
"public use" limitation).
41 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388, 394 (1798) (denouncing forced
transfers between private parties on the basis of the due process clause). In early
U.S. Supreme Court cases, the main constraint on takings for private use was the
due process clause, and it was not until later in the nineteenth century that "public
use" arose as a separate basis for invalidating governmental seizures. See James W.
Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, "Public Use," and New Directions in Takings Jurisprudence,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 845, 846 (2004) (stating that since 1872 courts have
interpreted the "public use" language of the Fifth Amendment as preventing
eminent domain for private purposes).
42 See Ely supra note 41, at 850 (noting some state courts deviated from the
general trend of interpreting the "public use" language of the Fifth Amendment as
preventing the use of eminent domain for private purposes); Philip Nichols, Jr., The
Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 617
(1940) (discussing the broad construction of "public use" in the nineteenth century).
43 See Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 901-05 (2004) (discussing the limited exception for transfers
of land to private owners of common carriers such as railroads).
44 See ELY, supra note 2, at 77-78 (arguing that although the courts initially did
not challenge eminent domain, by the nineteenth century, they began curtailing the
legislature's power to condemn land in response to the rapid commercial growth of
that era); Nichols, supra note 42, at 618 (explaining that the narrowing of the
concept of "public use" was due inpart to an increased understanding by the courts of
their role as "guardians of property rights").
45 See ELY, supra note 2, at 77-78 (outlining the evolution of the courts'
interpretation of substantive due process to safeguard property rights); Nichols,
supra note 42, at 618.
46 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that a statute restricting the working hours of
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already in decline. 47 The second half of the twentieth century
saw the public use limitation grow quieter still as the Supreme
Court approved government intervention in faltering land
markets. 48 Any doubts that the current Court would once again
second-guess public intrusion into the private sphere were
somewhat quelled by the decision in Kelo.49
Whereas the Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker50
addressed the taking of unblemished property in an area that
was indisputably blighted, Kelo involved the wholesale
appropriation and redevelopment of a neighborhood that had not
even been declared substandard under existing health and safety
codes. 51 Ruling for the City of New London, the Court declined to
impose substantive limits on the scope of ends justifying a
compensated taking in a situation where the legislative
ratification of those ends involved "a 'carefully considered'
development plan"52 and no untoward control by a particular
private beneficiary. 53 Although the dissents were quite strident,
one explicitly rejected the landowning Petitioners' reasonable
certainty of public benefit standard and neither advocated the
adoption of the Petitioners' academic supporters' means-end fit
test that the Court had used in recent exaction matters. 54
private employees was unconstitutional).
47 See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896)
(declaring that condemnations that serve a legitimate public purpose can be deemed
takings for public use).
48 See Claeys, supra note 43, at 907-08 (discussing the recognition of the
removal of "blight" as a "public use"). See generally Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S 229, 241-42 (1984) (holding that taking property to correct a "malfunctioning"
land market was constitutional); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954)
(holding that taking property for the redevelopment of blighted areas was
constitutional).
49 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005) (reaffirming the
Court's deference to legislative judgments of public purpose).
50 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954).
51 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2664-65 (recognizing that "[tihose who govern the City
were not confronted with the need to remove blight").
52 Id. at 2661.
53 Id. at 2665-67 (refusing to accept the petitioners' contention that a bright line
rule should be adopted to prevent the taking of private land for the purpose of
private economic development). For further discussion of various means-based
approaches to constraining eminent domain, see infra Part I.B.1.
54 Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "the judiciary cannot get
bogged down in predictive judgments about whether the public will actually be
better off after a property transfer."); Brief Amicus Curiae of Professors David L.
Callies, et al. in Support of Petitioners at *21-27, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.
Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803192 (urging the court to use "means-ends
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Federal public use jurisprudence remains focused on the range of
permissible government ends as opposed to the necessity of
eminent domain as a means to those ends. For now, that scope is
as broad as it has ever been.55
State constitutional limitations are a different matter.
Private property advocates have had some significant recent
successes in state appellate courts. In the case of County of
Wayne v. Hathcock,56 the Michigan Supreme Court repudiated its
holding in the infamous Poletown case.57 The court nominally
rejected the would-be condemnees' arguments that the proposed
taking for an industrial park violated Michigan's requirement
that public corporations use eminent domain only as necessary. 58
Nevertheless, the Hathcock court voided the condemnation as a
private-use taking because it failed to fit into one of the three
private transfer exceptions that the Court, based on state
constitutional law, constructed around the necessity of the taking
to the accomplishment of a public purpose. 59 Rather than being
drawn into a case-by-case review of the indispensability of every
controversial condemnation, the Michigan Supreme Court set out
broad principles for evaluating seizures for transfers to private
scrutiny in public use cases"). See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use
Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 934 (2003) (supporting the
means-based approach to constraining eminent domain).
55 It is worth noting that, although the decision was 5-4, both of the Justices
who have left the Court since the decision in Kelo were in the minority.
56 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
57 In overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455 (Mich. 1981), Michigan has banned the use of eminent domain for transfer to
private parties except in the three exceptions outlined in Justice Ryan's famous
Poletown dissent: (i) extreme public necessity (private utility dependent on specific
land for its very existence); (ii) continual government oversight (legally enforceable
public benefit); (iii) facts of independent significance (public objective not about the
ends, but about the means itself). County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765,
781-83 (Mich. 2004). Ilya Somin, while welcoming the Hathcock decision itself, has
expressed concerns that the latter exceptions are so indistinct as to render the
prohibition ineffective. See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1005, 1027-34 (2004).
58 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 776-78 (analyzing MICH. COMP. LAws § 213.23). It
is quite possible that the Hathcock court rejected the statutory objections to the
challenged condemnation so that it could reach the constitutional issues. See id. at
778.
59 Id. at 783-84 (holding that "no one sophisticated in the law... would have
understood 'public use' to permit the condemnation of defendants' properties for the
construction of a business and technology park owned by private entities").
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parties. 60 Its decision offers its counterparts in other states a
categorical approach to "public use" that approves those ends
that require eminent domain for their fulfillment
notwithstanding the eventual transfer of the condemned land to
a private party.
6 1
Few state high courts, however, have issued interpretations
of "for public use" that restrict eminent domain significantly
more than the federal courts' rational basis scrutiny.62  In
response to the public outcry against Kelo, however, their own
state legislatures are considering constitutional amendments to
prohibit condemnations for "economic development."63 But, like
their federal counterparts, most state courts essentially regard
condemnation bills as deserving no more review than regulatory
statutes as long as compensation is paid.
2. Just Compensation: The Limitation Yet To Be
The Fifth Amendment at best implicitly requires that
takings be "for public use."64  On the other hand, it expressly
forbids expropriation "without just compensation."65 Yet courts
have used only the former phrase to invalidate condemnations.
Just compensation has been relegated to being a condition
subsequent to eminent domain.66 When the legislature has found
60 Id. at 781-83 (highlighting the factors discussed by Justice Ryan in his
dissent in Poletown).
61 More recently still, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously rejected a
condemnation based on the declared need to prevent future deterioration in a
neighborhood. Norwood v. Horney, Nos. 2005-0227, 2005-0228, 2005-1210, 2006 WL
2096001, at *4 (Ohio July 26, 2006).
62 See, e.g., Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542, 575 (Haw. 2006) (affirming
rational basis review of eminent domain); R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892
A.2d 87, 103 (R.I. 2006) (emphasizing that rational basis review should be applied to
legislative takings). The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority v. National City Environmental, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002), is,
however, another notable recent exception to use of rationality review.
63 See Sandefur, supra note 8, at 706 (noting that after the Kelo decision,
legislators in a majority of the states began working to amend their state
constitutions).
64 Cf. Nichols, supra note 42, at 616. ("Surely, if the framers of the Constitution
had meant that property not be taken for private use at all, they would have said
so."). But cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2672 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "public use" is a meaningful restriction on takings); id. at
2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that if the "public use" clause was not
interpreted restrictively, it would be "meaningless").
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66 To a claim that a municipality's condemnation of a water utility franchise
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that certain private property must be obtained "for public use,"
then just compensation becomes strictly a quantitative issue:
How much money must the condemnor pay to the condemnee? 67
At least in seizures that do not implicate fundamental rights,68
the courts presume that a cash award can be just compensation.
Courts have repeatedly affirmed that the concept of just
compensation is an equitable one. 69 While the judiciary has
largely left the issue of public use up to the legislature, the
proper measure of just compensation remains within the purview
of the courts.70  Raising expectations for intervention even
further, the Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of
constitutionally mandated compensation is to make the owner
"whole"'71 and to put him "in the same position monetarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken."72 The
courts have reduced these broad principles, however, to valuation
rules that limit required indemnification to the fair market value
of the taken property.
was prohibited by the Contracts Clause, Justice Brewer, in his 1897 opinion in Long
Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, responded:
All private property is held subject to the demands of a public use. The
constitutional guarantee of just compensation is not a limitation of the
power to take, but only a condition of its exercise. Whenever public uses
require, the government may appropriate any private property on the
payment of just compensation.
166 U.S. 685, 689 (1896).
By denying, in dictum, the "just compensation" clause any status as a bar
against eminent domain, the Long Island Water Supply Court was merely
emphasizing for "public use" as the only prior restraint on the authority to
condemn. See id.
67 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 297 n.40 (1981), Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932),
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893), United
States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883)).
68 See Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Targeting First Amendment Land
Uses, 69 Mo. L. REV. 653, 655 (2004) (discussing the heightened scrutiny given to
takings that impact First Amendment rights); infra notes 144-147 and
accompanying text.
69 See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470, 478 (1973); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121,
123-24 (1950); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254-57 (1934); Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (illustrating the "natural
equity" of just compensation).
70 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 327-28 (explaining that the "measure of
comepnsation" is a "judicial and not a legislative question.").
71 Olson, 292 U.S. at 255.
72 United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
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In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,73 the
Supreme Court articulated a depersonalized view of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of just compensation: 74
There can.., be no doubt that the compensation must be a full
and perfect equivalent for the property taken. And this just
compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to
the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment is
personal. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime," etc. Instead of continuing that form
of statement, and saying that no person shall be deprived of his
property without just compensation, the personal element is left
out, and the "just compensation" is to be a full equivalent for the
property taken. This excludes the taking into account, as an
element in the compensation, any supposed benefit that the
owner may receive in common with all from the public uses to
which his private property is appropriated, and leaves it, to
stand as a declaration, that no private property shall be
appropriated to public uses unless a full and exact equivalent
for it be returned to the owner. 75
The Monongahela Court excluded from the compensation
calculation considerations of how the condemnation affected the
property owner.76 The only subject of the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of just compensation was the taken property itself.77
The Court actually used this in rem understanding of the
Takings Clause to protect the condemnee in Monongahela from
the government's attempts to recapture the monetary value of
the enhancement to the condemnee's remaining property
occasioned by the planned public investment.7 The Court's
exclusive focus on the value of the property, however, quickly led
to the adoption of fair market value as the quite limiting default
rule for constitutionally mandated compensation.7 9
73 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
74 See id. at 325-26.
75 Id. at 326.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 285 (1943) ("[T]he
Fifth Amendment allows the owner only the fair market value of his property; it
does not guarantee him a return of his investment."); United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 80-81 (1913) ("The owner must be
compensated for what is taken from him, [and] that is done when he is paid its fair
market value...."); see also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 22-
23 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The courts have not pretended that fair market value for
taken property will reimburse condemnees for all losses as a
result of the taking. In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,80
Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The value of property springs from subjective needs and
attitudes; its value to the owner may therefore differ widely
from its value to the taker. Most things, however, have a
general demand which gives them a value transferable from one
owner to another. As opposed to such personal and variant
standards as value to the particular owner whose property has
been taken, this transferable value has an external validity
which makes it a fair measure of public obligation to
compensate the loss incurred by an owner as a result of the
taking of his property for public use. In view, however, of the
liability of all property to condemnation for the common good,
loss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his
unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like
loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as
part of the burden of common citizenship.81
In rejecting the more subjective measure of use value for the
objective standard of a property's exchange value on the open
market, the Court acknowledged that some condemnees would
not be fully compensated for their losses.8 2 Analogizing to the
unevenness of regulatory burdens validated in contemporary
Takings Clause jurisprudence, Justice Frankfurter saw these
unreimbursed costs as part of the price of citizenship.8 3 Some
people will suffer more because they will lose property that is
particularly dear to them. To the extent that they are not made
whole by payment of the property's fair market value, they can
hope to benefit from the burdens that government places on
others thereby maintaining the "average reciprocity of
advantage."8 4
Of course the extensive jurisprudence in regulatory takings
has established, however confusingly, that the extent to which
individual citizens will be expected to bear such uncompensated
80 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
81 Id. at 5.
82 See id.
83 See id. (citing Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-09
(1923)).
84 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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burdens has its limits.8 5 If an uncompensated regulatory taking
goes "too far," then the government must pay compensation.8 6
What then do the courts do about a condemnation that inflicts
severe incompensable losses?
The inability of a condemnee to cover losses from the market
has led courts to ignore the losses as irrelevant to the
condemnation process.8 7 If the market value compensation due is
not itself adequate remuneration, the unquestioned necessity of
the taking has required that it be deemed so. But when a
condemnation's public goal can be met by any number of means,
the insistence that an owner's subjective valuation be ignored
rings hollow.
Some commentators have noted that the payment of cash
premiums can deter government from overusing condemnation
against owners who suffer incompensable losses.88 They point to
the New Hampshire mill statute upheld in Head v. Amoskeag
Mfg. Co.89  as an attempt to redress systematic under-
compensation. 90 That law called for owners whose lands were
flooded by the establishment of private mills to be paid 150% of
the market value of the lost property.9' For those generally
concerned about inefficient overuse of eminent domain,
supercompensation forces government to internalize more fully
the true costs of the taking.92  For the owners themselves,
15 See id. at 413-16; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960)
('The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.").
86 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (1922); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 141-42, 147-48 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87 See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5-7, 11-12, 14-15
(1949).
88 See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 174-75, 184; Claeys, supra note 43, at 923-28;
Merrill, supra note 40, at 90-93 (proposing to "increase costs in those situations
where we wish to discourage the use of eminent domain" through the use of a surtax
or bonus payment).
89 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
90 See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 174-75; Claeys, supra note 43, at 923-28.
91 See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 12 (1885) (affirming the
judgment of the lower court that "upon payment or tender of the damages assessed
by the verdict, with interest, and fifty per cent. added .... the company ha[d] the
right to erect and maintain the dam"); Claeys, supra note 43, at 923 (noting that
injured riparians would be entitled to receive "150% of their actual damages").
92 See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 174-75; Claeys, supra note 43, at 923-28.
While commentators have recognized the just compensation requirement that the
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however, the extra money may or may not enable them to replace
what they have identified as their losses.93
The unnecessary taking of irreplaceable property then calls
for an understanding of just compensation that goes beyond
damage award calculation. The choice between ignoring
subjective losses and paying for them in full excludes a variety of
more productive alternatives. The express constitutional
requirement of just compensation must be set free from its role
as a quantitative afterthought in the decision to condemn. A full
understanding of the appropriateness of eminent domain will
cross-reference the land needs of both property owners and the
public. The variety of possible matches calls for a two-
dimensional mapping of public necessity and condemnee
compensability. 94 The next two sections will offer categories
under each of these parameters based upon a theoretical
understanding of the particular need for land that makes
eminent domain both essential and problematic.
B. A Socioeconomic Theory of Eminent Domain
1. Public Necessity When Condemnors Face Thin Markets
Focusing on the last two words of the phrase "taken for
public use," courts have restricted their review of the propriety of
condemnations to the legitimacy of the government's purpose in
seizing land.95 The words "taken for," however, suggest the
expectation of some logical connection between the taking and
the public objective. Some state delegations of eminent domain
condemnor internalize costs monetarily, others point out that governmental decision
makers respond more to their own political cost-benefit analysis than to public
budgetary considerations generally. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for
Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstractid=
894378.
93 See Michelman, supra note 17, at 1111-12 (remarking that in many instances
money can not compensate for lost property). For further discussion of condemnee
ability to replace surpluses lost in condemnation, see infra Part I.B.2.
94 See infra Part I.C.4, Figure 1.
95 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S 229, 241 (1984) ("[Where the
exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the
Public Use Clause."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33, 35-36 (1954) (holding
that the elimination of substandard housing conditions satisfied the public use
requirement and thus justified the exercise of eminent domain).
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authority make "public necessity" an explicit prerequisite for its
use and subject findings of necessity to de novo judicial review.96
Other states have interpreted general public use language as
requiring scrutiny of the choice of eminent domain as a means.97
Most courts, however, question the legitimacy of a legislature's
choice of eminent domain as a means even less frequently than
they will question the objective itself.98 Recognizing increased
local governmental activism in the era of public choice, legal
commentators concerned about overuse of eminent domain have
nevertheless continued to develop tests for condemnation
legitimacy that focus on the market alternatives available to the
condemnor. 99
Twenty years ago, in his article The Economics of Public Use,
Thomas Merrill articulated a model for understanding public use
that invoked the distinction between property rules and liability
96 See MINN. STAT. § 117.075 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 502-510 (2000);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2299(b)(1), § 2299(e) (1992); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 163.09 (2005) (rebuttable presumption of necessity).
97 See e.g., Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250, 1254
(Colo. 1973) (en banc) (holding that the state had to justify its use of eminent domain
against church property).
98 See, e.g., Mich. State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d 416,
423-24 (Mich. 1974) (considering the necessity and purpose of widening a road);
Rueb v. City of Okla. City, 435 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla. 1967) (per curiam) (analyzing in
detail the need for an airport runway); Portland v. Swanson, 459 P.2d 879, 880 (Or.
1969) (per curiam) (limiting an analysis of the necessity of using eminent domain to
whether fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion had been shown); Capital Prop., Inc.
v. R.I., 749 A.2d 1069, 1087 (R.I. 1999) (adopting the opinion of the lower court
which held that the city acted in bad faith when it condemned a parcel as blighted
without making the necessary findings of fact). For a legal history of the distinction
between public use and public necessity showing greater judicial deference on the
latter issue, see Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent
Domain in California: A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use",
32 Sw. U. L. REV. 569, nn. 34-35 and accompanying text.
99 See Fennell, supra note 15, at 984-85 (providing a method of questioning
nuisance control); Garnett, supra note 54, at 980-81 (describing land use controls
that the government could employ in public use challenges); Merrill, supra note 40,
at 77-78 (discussing how "eminent domain is a more expensive way of acquiring
resources than market exchange"). Alberto Lopez examines the jurisprudence of
public use and just compensation as expressions of republican and liberal political
theories. Alberto Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 243-45 (2006). John Fee, in
his recent article, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 783 (2006), also begins his analysis by examining public use. Id at 800-03.
Both Lopez and Fee ultimately conclude that a proper balance will be achieved
through mandating increased monetary compensation to condemnees. Lopez, supra,
at 299-301; Fee, supra, at 806-18.
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rules articulated by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in
their work, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: A
View of the Cathedral.100 Calabresi and Melamed set out the
difference between property rule entitlements, which can protect
their holders against unwanted transfers through injunctions,
and liability rule entitlements, which require their holders to
accept a cash equivalent as a substitute for their property.' 10
When eminent domain is approved, the owner, along with every
other stakeholder in the property, loses his or her ability to
decline the sale, and only the adjudication of the sale price issue
remains. 10 2 Although strong property rule entitlements are the
norm in land ownership, 10 3 eminent domain reminds all property
owners that their rights are always subject to at least one form of
liability rule liquidation.
Merrill applied to the public use question Calabresi and
Melamed's central insight that liability rules are suitable for
reducing the inefficiently high transaction costs associated with
property rule entitlements. 0 4 His basic model proposed that the
"for public use" requirement should constrain the condemnor if,
and only if, the free market is sufficiently thick to make
100 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13.
101 See id. at 1105-06.
102 Eminent domain is not the only instance of the government forcing a person
to accept monetary compensation for the loss of unique property. The standard
judicial remedy for the negligently caused loss of something irreplaceable, such as a
limb, is not an injunction against the tortfeasor to make the victim literally whole,
but the award of a money judgment in favor of the victim against the person
responsible for the loss.
103 See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2187
(1997) (suggesting that property rules are the default because their advantages
outweigh their disadvantages). Few forms of property ownership can match real
estate for strength as a property rule entitlement. Debtors are generally given
significant opportunities to redeem their land holdings from involuntary liquidation.
Contracts dealing with land are regularly enforced through injunctions requiring
specific performance.
104 See Merrill, supra note 40, at 74 (asserting that where a market exists for
what the government wants, eminent domain should not be invoked). See generally
Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 13, at 1110 (explaining that "market valuation
of [an] entitlement is deemed inefficient," so liability rules instead of property rules
are often employed). In the last ten years, there has been a lively scholarly debate
about the advantages of liability rules over property rules. See Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 15-17; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 773-74
(1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 450-51 (1995); Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1748-53 (2004).
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invocation of eminent domain unnecessary.105  If the
governmental authority's identified public objective could be met
only by the acquisition of a particular piece of land, the lack of
any acceptable substitutes could tempt an aware owner of such a
unique parcel to engage in strategic bargaining and "hold out" for
an astronomical sum. 10 6 But for the availability of eminent
domain, the thinness of the condemnor's market (i.e., the lack of
alternatives to a negotiated agreement with a particular owner)
puts the private landowner at the head of a monopoly, one that
has the power to exact its surplus and more from the public fisc.
On the other hand, if the would-be condemnor finds itself
with a large number of purchase opportunities that will more or
less equally meet the public goal, then the use of eminent domain
may be unnecessary. 10 7 The owners of at least some of the
properties will be competing with one another to sell, and the use
of eminent domain will be superfluous. 08
In testing this basic model, Merrill classified more than two
hundred judicial opinions into six separate categories. 10 9  A
simpler categorization of eminent domain based on public
necessity can sort most or all governmental seizures of land into
three classes. 110 The first category, which I will refer to as
"Public Trust," comprises those largely uncontroversial
105 See Merrill, supra note 40, at 77-81 (implying that use of eminent domain in
a thick market would be pointless because it is more expensive than a free market
exchange). Merrill went on, however, to refine his analysis in anticipation of three
objections to his basic model. First, and most interestingly for the project of the
current Article, he acknowledged that condemnees' subjective losses-not
compensated and, therefore, not internalized by the condemning authority-may be
high enough to make certain condemnations inefficient and, therefore, overused
from an efficiency perspective. Id. at 82-84.
106 See id. at 75.
107 See id. at 77-78 (stating that market exchange is a more efficient tool than
eminent domain when dealing in thick markets).
108 See id. As Merrill pointed out, since the government internalized
administrative costs would naturally deter such unnecessary use of eminent domain,
the basic model would predict little need for judicial intervention. See id.
109 See id. at 93-102. The first five had descriptive titles such as "Assembly" and
"Expanding Existing Facilities," but Merrill conclusorily labeled the last category
"Thick Markets." Id. at 97-101.
110 These three categories roughly correspond to the three exceptions articulated
by Justice Ryan in his dissent in Poletown, and adopted in Hathcock. As exceptions
to a general prohibition against condemnations for private transfer, the Hathcock
categories are designed to exempt a limited number of worthy condemnations. See
supra note 57. I set out my classification, on the other hand, to cover all uses of
eminent domain regardless of public or private acquisition. See infra Part I.C.4.
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dedications of land to a public purpose.111 Local governments,
however, are increasingly offering their coercive purchasing
ability as just one of many incentives to attract or retain private
investors. As the economic development spurred by such takings
generally affects an area far beyond the condemned district, I
will call it "Subsidy Inducement for Regional Economic
Development."11 2 Finally, there are cases in which eminent
domain is used to overcome collective action problems that
thwart the efficient pooling of land ownership interests. Unlike
with economic development promotion, in which the land is
incidental to the public purpose, the public authorities here are
focused on the land itself but only wish to intervene briefly so as
to stimulate market forces. The heart of urban redevelopment,
"Anti-Blight Investment Coordination," will be discussed in the
next section.113
Certain types of public projects always require the
acquisition of land. 114 In the uncontroversial case of the need for
a site for the erection of a new governmental building, the
question of alternatives to the acquisition of land produces a
straightforward response: There are none. Public enterprises,
like their private counterparts, take up space. If the government
is to have its building, it needs land upon which to construct it.115
No other case could better illustrate Justice William Paterson's
assertion of the fundamental indispensability of the "despotic
power" of eminent domain: "[The] government could not subsist
without it."116
Of course if every condemnation case involved such a
straightforward governmental need for land, there would be no
controversy over "public use." For more than two centuries
privately owned utilities and so-called "common carriers" have
111 See infra notes 114-15, 118-19 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
113 See infra Part I.C.2.
114 Merrill, supra note 40, at 75 (providing an example of an oil pipeline project
requiring land acquisition because there was only one feasible route).
115 Of course, there may be many different sites that would be suitable for the
government's purposes. Some of them may be owner occupied and others may only
be absentee owned. In public trust cases, the decision of which site to be used should
be made by the governmental authority subject to an impact study that would weigh
the costs of displacement. See infra Part I.C.2.
116 Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311 (1795) (emphasis
added).
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also been authorized to condemn the land they require. 117 Even
those commentators with the strictest interpretation of public
use recognize that a compulsory transfer need not result in title
in the name of a governmental entity to be legitimate. 118 Here
the public need is satisfied not so much by actual possession as
by public access. Yet the inescapable need for land is the same.
The fact that securing the former requires full title and obtaining
the latter only an easement does not, in itself, matter. 119 They
both entail acquisition of an interest, possessory or non-
possessory, in that ubiquitous yet unique good: land. All projects
that require the placing of land in a public trust should have
broad access to the sovereign's traditional eminent domain
authority. 120
The truly significant conceptual break in public use cases
comes with the move to the contemporary local government
practice of offering eminent domain land acquisition services as
an inducement and subsidy to businesses making siting decisions
for major development investments. 121 Fierce competition among
localities to attract job producing business investment has led
city, county and state governments to put together packages of
117 See ELY, supra note 2, at 75-77 (discussing the use of eminent domain for
the canals, wharfs, and trains).
118 The Mill Act cases, in which publicly accessible, private mills were allowed to
flood adjoining land upstream to fulfill a community economic need, enjoy broad
approval. See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 170-75; Claeys, supra note 43, at 919-28.
Railroads and pipelines offer more contemporary examples of relatively
uncontroversial "private" deployments of eminent domain. Wayne County v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 795-96 (Mich. 2004).
119 Conversely, the fact that bare title, or even full possession and control, will
remain in the name of an acknowledged governmental entity does not, in and of
itself, place the condemnation in this first category labeled "Public Trust." A local
government with broad authority may decide that the acquisition of prime real
estate for itself may be an excellent way to secure a stream of future revenue. While
this may be one of several valid public investment strategies, nothing about the
underlying public objective requires the governmental acquisition of any specific
parcel or, indeed, any parcel at all. See supra note 114 and infra note 119 and
accompanying text.
120 The availability of many different parcels that might satisfy a particular
public objective should not deprive the government of the ability of eminent domain,
rather a process to review its impact on the various sets of potential condemnees is
in order. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
121 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC
DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT 13-14, 95-97 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1991)
(providing examples of benefits governments bestow upon private corporations and
developers, including tax subsidies, financing, and the promise of the government's
power of eminent domain).
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incentives. 122 Tax breaks and low-interest financing often form
the bulk of the subsidies used to woo potential investors. 23 But,
for those industries that could benefit from the services of a
buyer's broker with true clout, eminent domain land acquisition
becomes another inducement option. 124 A municipality that can
compel land transfer for a private project may well be able to
capture for itself, in the form of reduced tax abatements, much of
the private enterprise's costs savings over voluntary land
purchase.
Although fostering economic development is undoubtedly a
legitimate public purpose, 125 the aforementioned advantages of
offering other people's land for sale encourages the overuse of
eminent domain toward that end. 126 Certainly some businesses
will have land needs that are so vast or so specific as to make
voluntary land acquisition prohibitively expensive. But a city
may be able to achieve its economic development goals by seeking
out other businesses that require only tax incentives. Yet the
lack of legal constraints on condemnation may not encourage
takers to explore these options.127 The theoretical possibility that
eminent domain might be indispensable to a municipality's
economic development goals cannot justify a conclusive
presumption in favor of condemnation as a legitimate means of
meeting the goal. 128
122 ALAN ALTSHULER & DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGA-PROJECTS: THE CHANGING
POLITICS OF URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENT 241 (2003).
123 See id. See generally BERNARD FRIEDEN & LYNNE SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN,
INC. 133-71 (1990) (providing an overview of how city officials make deals to
encourage project development).
124 See MALLOY, supra note 121, at 95-97.
125 See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. City of Warr Acres, 946 P.2d 1140, 1144
(Okla. 1997) (noting that economic development was recognized as a legitimate
public purpose in Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 771 P.2d. 608, 611 (Okla. 1989)); see
also Brown, 946 P.2d at 1146-49 (Kauger, J., concurring) (citing support from
various state courts that recognize economic development as a legitimate public
purpose).
126 MALLOY, supra note 121, at 95-97 (1991).
127 Several commentators, however, have noted that eminent domain's political
unpopularity, along with the procedural requirements imposed by delegation
statutes, acts as an effective check on eminent domain's overuse. See generally
Merrill, supra note 40, at 77 (reasoning that procedural requirements and
administrative costs can make the exercise of eminent domain more expensive than
"market exchange").
128 Ultimately though, a municipality should not be deprived of the ability to
condemn land, even that of a community united in opposition, when such
condemnation is absolutely necessary to the economic sustainability of other local
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Determining the true propriety of a condemnation is no more
than half over, however, after consideration of public necessity.
The thickness of a condemnor's market can only provide the first
part of the analysis of eminent domain legitimacy. The
placement of a public objective into one category or another will
not, by itself, determine whether or not it can serve as a
justification for land seizure. The condemnation not only
acquires a unique good to satisfy a public objective but also
deprives someone or something of that unique good. 129 The
adequacy of the cash compensation offered as part of the
compulsory transfer unavoidably depends on the condemnee's
ability to cover his losses in the markets available. Just as public
necessity is evaluated by the thickness of the condemnor's
market, the possibility of just compensation can only be
established by examining the liquidity of the condemnee's market
for substitutes. 130 Those types of public takings that can be
replaced by less coercive means must be evaluated against the
interests of affected private property holders.
2. Lack of Just Compensation When Condemnees Face Thin
Markets
In defending the importance of property rules against those
who favor liability rules, Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky have structured a theory of property as promoting
communities similarly situated. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
129 Note, Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in Eminent Domain:
Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389, 398 (1985).
130 As the analysis moves from the market thickness for condemning authorities
seeking to realize one or more public objectives to that of natural person condemnees
seeking to regain that which has been taken from them, a question is raised about
whether subjective evaluation of property should even be considered in determining
market thickness. Someone might argue that if a house is taken and there are
plenty of houses "just like it" available for purchase, then the condemnee's
replacement market is thick by any reasonable understanding of the term. While I
argue below that surpluses that provide social benefit deserve special consideration,
my minimal criterion for consideration of subjective appreciation of property in
assessing market thickness is one of intelligibility. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973) ("The property owner with a common nonfungible
surplus is normally sensitive, not hypersensitive, and consequently not likely to be
the best avoider of losses of that surplus."). A person whose attachment to a
particular object cannot be understood through rational discourse or broadly shared
empathy can be safely dismissed as suffering from fetishism. For Peggy Radin's
exploration of "The Problem of Fetishism", see Radin, supra note 16, at 968-70.
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the goods that flow from stability of ownership.13' Liability rules
that employ exchange value as the measure of damages fail to
protect rational gaps between an owner's reserve price and their
market price. 132 Preservation of these private surpluses, 133 even
against governmental elimination, can foster socially beneficial
activities that raise use value but do not necessarily increase
exchange value.1 34
For instance, a homeowner who has confidence that she can
never be forced to move against her will may spend a great deal
of time getting to know her neighbors. Whereas one who feels
she may well be displaced on short notice might not bother to
invest in relationships with an uncertain future. For the stable
homeowner, the development of productive and rewarding
interaction with her fellow community members will not only
make her value her property more highly, it will also increase the
social capital of the community. 135 In setting out constraints for
eminent domain, truly just compensation will reflect the need to
strengthen those forms of ownership that convert increased
stability into social dividends. 136
131 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 552 (arguing that "a property
system with stable rights increases the value of assets to... owners").
132 See id. at 567-68, 587.
133 In discussing surpluses lost by condemnees, I will focus on the so-called
consumer surplus, that is, the "amount" by which the owner's subjective valuation
exceeds the fair market value. I will not address the distribution of the so-called
social surplus, or the amount of increase in the value of the property occasioned by
the condemnation itself. Suffice it to say, I believe that current law requiring that
any private benefit from a condemnation be merely incidental to the stated public
purpose provides adequate protection against misdirection of this value. See
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896); Phillips v. Foster, 211 S.E.2d 93, 96 (1975).
Analogous law is well-established in the protection of tax expenditure subsidies of
charitable organizations. See, e.g., Redlands Surgical Serv. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47,
73-74 (1999), a/l'd, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
134 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 557-58.
135 A voluminous amount of literature has risen up around the concept of "social
capital" and its importance to community development. See, e.g., WILLIAM R
POTAPCHUK, ET AL., BUILDING COMMUNITY: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF SOCIAL
CAPITAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1998); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone:
America's Declining Social Capital, 6.1 J. OF DEMOCRACY 65 (1995), available at
http://xroads.virginia.edu/-HYPERdetoc/assoclbowling.html. For a recent discussion
of how the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative actually used eminent domain in
its strategy to build social capital in an impoverished community, see Michele E.
Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare
System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 790-93 (2005); infra notes 189, 267.
136 Empirical research has validated many of the social and economic benefits
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Just as the last section evaluated the ability of the
government to meet its public objectives as a market participant,
this section will look at the ability of condemnees to preserve
their surpluses in the market with nothing but the fair market
value of their property. Condemnees deprived of fundamental
rights find little or no solace in their condemnation awards. The
Fifth Amendment's ban on takings without just compensation
might be construed to join other protections of these freedoms.
At the other end of condemnee market thickness, land
speculators can be fully restored to their pre-taking positions
through payment of their fair market value. As indicated
previously, redevelopment of urban neighborhoods presents just
compensation's middle case of the uprooting of long-time
homeowners. It will be discussed in the next section. 137
When owners are forced to take fair market value for
property which they value more highly than the market does, the
taking deprives them, at least temporarily, of their surplus, that
is, the difference between their reserve price and the fair market
value. Several writers have pointed out that the general failure
to compensate condemnee surpluses can foster overuse of
condemnations due to the inaccurate efficiency calculation. 138
From a fairness perspective, even a socially efficient taking may
disproportionately place its burdens on a select few.1 39 Both
commonly associated with stable homeownership. See GEORGE MCCARTHY ET AL.,
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND COSTS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 1-4, 32-35 (2001),
http://housingamerica.org/docs/RIHAwpOl-02.pdf; WILLIAM M. ROHE ET AL., THE
SOCIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 1-2 (2000), http:/housing
america.org/docs/RIHAwpOO-01.pdf.
137 See infra Part I.C.
138 See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 161-81; Merrill, supra note 40, at 82-85;
James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859,
864-65 (2004). A Kaldor-Hicks efficiency calculation could take consumer surpluses
into account in judging the cost of the taking without actually compensating them if
the taking were to go forward. Although the actual compensation approach of Pareto
cost-benefit analysis would seem to be more favorable to condemnees, a method that
assesses consumer surplus purely for the purpose of determining whether or not a
condemnation should take place may be preferable to one in which consumer surplus
is not assessed at all. Indeed, I will argue later in the Article that a system that
offers communal in-kind compensation for consumer surpluses may be preferable to
both of these other alternatives from a community development point of view. See
infra Part I.C.2.
139 To repeat Justice Black's often quoted description, the Takings Clause was
drafted "to bar [g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For an analysis of the staying
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justice and efficiency concerns call for a deeper understanding of
the natures of the consumer surpluses and how, if at all, they
should be protected.
Surpluses can result from an owner's singular appreciation
from his property. Some owners may own land that suits their
particular needs. 140 To the extent enjoyment of their properties
is not widely shared, fair market value may not reflect how they
value their own properties. Some owners' valuation may be so
idiosyncratic as to be unintelligible.14 1 Others, however, may
simply have unique needs. 142 For instance, a person confined to a
wheelchair may value his current home for its accessible design.
More ambulatory buyers may be indifferent to its special
features. Because these less sensitive buyers are so much more
numerous, the market price will not reflect the utility that he
and others similarly disabled would find in the property. If this
general lack of appreciation does not adversely impact supply
however, this lower market price may not be a severe problem in
a condemnation situation.
For many such inframarginal minority condemnees, the
surplus will not be lost for long. If their replacement markets are
sufficiently thick, they should find exactly what they particularly
appreciated about their former property in another property at a
substantially similar price. 143 Not all individualized valuations
power of this statement, see William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the
Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151,
1153-54 (1997).
140 Bell & Parchomovsky illustrate a substantially similar point about surpluses
with the example of a harpsichordist who has developed unique abilities related to
her instrument. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 568.
141 See Radin, supra note 16, at 969-70.
142 Unique invulnerabilities can also occasion surpluses. Someone who stands
6' 5" and weighs 280 lbs. may not mind living in an area known for frequent street
level robberies. The market value of his home, however, would reflect the fact that
most buyers would be more directly impacted by the crime rate. If his home were
condemned, he would be able to replicate his surplus to the extent he could relocate
to a similar house in a similar neighborhood. For a discussion of how statutory law
has come to protect owner-occupants' surpluses, see infra Part II.A. 1.
143 Albeit in the context of nuisance law, Ellickson has recognized this
important but often neglected point about the taking of surpluses "when property is
fungible; the owner can recover lost surplus by repurchasing the lost item at market
prices." Ellickson, supra note 130, at 736. Epstein also acknowledges that
replacement cost can lie below the subjective valuation of a condemnee and that,
therefore, some condemnees can be made whole at something closer to market price.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 183-84 ("If the replacement cost lies between the
general market value and some higher subjective valuation, then compensation is
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are sentimental; some are very practical and replicable.
Payment of a subjective loss premium to these condemnees would
be just that, a premium. Only those condemnees who are unable
to regain what they lost can truly claim the sort of
undercompensation that might render fair market valuation
inefficient or unjust or both.
When eminent domain is used to deprive a citizen of
property inextricably connected to a fundamental right, cash
compensation may not lead to the restoration of the fundamental
right.144 For instance, a municipality that wishes to prevent a
property owner from using his property for a legal but politically
unpopular activity might simply condemn the property. An
attempt by the owner to buy a replacement property might end
the same way. Here the law imposes injunctive limits on
eminent domain, even if some other public objective is concocted
to cover the true purpose behind the taking. 145  Instead of
describing the incompensability of the loss of liberty as a
violation of the "just compensation" clause, the cases emphasize
either eminent domain's confinement to property rights 46 or
general substantive due process restrictions on all government
action. 147 Nevertheless, the general ban on such takings ratifies
the view that these rights are quite literally priceless. The
stability of the ownership of these entitlements is so fundamental
to the functioning of our democracy that even a more forceful
conception of "just compensation" might still play a supporting
role to more traditional defenses.
adequate because it permits the owner to duplicate the condemned facilities and
thus regain the [surplus] ....").
144 See Saxer, supra note 68, at 691.
145 See generally id. at 655-84 (noting that the constitutional protection for First
Amendment land uses is anything but absolute). Radin notes the relevance of
substantive due process to the protection of personal property rights. In the context
of residency, she cites the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-506 (1977), which "found a substantive due process
right to live in one's home with one's extended family, hence a substantive due
process limitation on the power of local government to zone for occupancy by nuclear
families only." Radin, supra note 16, 1005-06 n.172.
146 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.1[4] (2006) (stating that "[flights of a
citizen which are not property rights cannot be taken by eminent domain" and
providing the right to vote as one chooses as an example of this concept).
147 Saxer, supra note 68, at 654 (advocating "that courts should distinguish
between the government exercising eminent domain and the government using
typical land use regulation and should impose stricter constitutional limitations on
the eminent domain power").
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For some property owners, a condemned parcel may be
merely a fungible investment, but for many, the exchange value
is the only value the property has. 148 Other more particular
investors may look at the fair market value condemnation award
as quantitatively adequate and qualitatively inadequate, but
only because cash does not have the same risk and reward
prospects that their real estate had. These owners experience
the threat of condemnation essentially as a prepayment risk. 149
The unplanned liquidation of their holding requires them to seek
new investment opportunities. Their replacement purchases
may or may not even involve land. Their uncompensated losses
from condemnation, in any case, extend no further than the
transaction costs involved in reinvestment.
Generally speaking, the strengthening of property rules
correlates with our natural inclination to favor ownership
stability. Empirical research in the fields of cognitive psychology
and behavioral economics has shown widespread tendencies
among all sorts of property owners to hold on to their
entitlements. 150 Even prices that exceed what they would have
paid to obtain the item in the first place do not induce them to
part with it.151 The documentation of these "endowment effects"
reveals a world stubbornly supportive of stable ownership.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have accounted for
these disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept as cases of loss aversion. 52 We are more willing to forgo
future gains than to voluntarily incur losses because our minds
148 Using the terminology Madeline Morris sets out in her article, The Structure
of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 831-33 (1993), the in-kind enjoyment
component of a true investor's property rule entitlement is superfluous.
149 Unlike the creditor's more well-known problem of default risk, being repaid
late or not at all, prepayment risk measures the anticipated disadvantage of being
repaid earlier than expected and that an optimal substitute investment may not be
readily available, at least not without cost.
150 See generally RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 66 (1992) (suggesting that owners are generally more
"reluctant to part with their endowment" than buyers are "unwilling to part with
their cash").
151 See id.
152 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-42 (1984). Of course, in one sense, we would expect every
rational person to be averse to losing something, but Kahneman and Tversky's
account might be better described as aversion to compensated losses. It reflects a
distrust in compensation even when the amount offered for an item is equivalent to
the most the person himself would be willing to pay to acquire the item.
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process prospective disadvantages differently than potential
advantages, exaggerating the former to the neglect of the
latter. 153  Money, as the ultimate embodiment of potential
advantage, will always come up short as a result of such
biases. 154  But it does not suffer alone. Property bought
specifically for resale will also not produce as great a degree of
loss aversion as property bought for use. 155
Interestingly, for a socioeconomic perspective on eminent
domain, differences between an owner's reservation price and his
or her own maximum purchase price become more pronounced
when substitutes are not generally available, 156 when the
proposed loss is occasioned by human actions rather than
naturally caused, 15 7 and when the entitlement holder has control
over its sale, or at least the expectation of such control.158 For
homeowners suddenly facing condemnation by their local
153 See id.
154 'Money itself does not create an endowment effect ...." Russell Korobkin,
The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2003).
155 "Loss aversion does not affect all transactions. In a normal commercial
transaction, the seller does not suffer a loss when trading a good .... Loss aversion
is expected to primarily affect owners of goods that had been bought for use rather
than for eventual resale." THALER, supra note 150, at 72 n.3.
156 Wiktor L. Adamowicz, Vinay Bhardwaj and Bruce Macnab, Experiments on
the Difference between Willingness To Pay and Willingness To Accept, 69 LAND
ECON. 416, 418 (1993) (noting that Hanemann's "substitute hypothesis" theory can
be tested "within an economic methodology"); W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness To
Pay and Willingness To Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635,
635 (1991); Jason Shogren, et al., Resolving Differences in Willingness To Pay and
Willingness To Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 255, 255-58 (1994) (illustrating
Hanemann's "substitution effects" theories).
157 Michael E. Walker et al., Disparate WTA-WTP Disparities: The Influence of
Human versus Natural Causes, 12 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 219, 221 (1999).
158 See Jeffrey L. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of
Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1575-76 (1998). Rachlinski and Jourden try to
establish empirically that liability rule entitlements are less likely to give rise to
endowment effects than property rule entitlements. Although private land
ownership is a liability rule entitlement with respect to the government's needs, it is
generally thought of as a property rule entitlement. The widespread expectation of
security of tenure may be more important than the technical legal reality in terms of
establishing an endowment effect. In other words, well-settled "public use"
jurisprudence in favor of eminent domain may not change the fact that people do not
expect their land to be taken from them. David Dana has recently connected the
popular revolt against eminent domain abuse to the fact that white, middle-class
homeowners now see themselves as vulnerable to compulsory takings. David A.
Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo 2
(Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 917891, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=917891.
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government, then, one should expect to see genuine resistance to
compulsory transfers notwithstanding the fact that the price
offered may exceed what those homeowners would be willing to
pay for the property themselves. 159 Because it is a quasi-rational
behavior that splits our understanding of how people "rationally"
value goods, loss aversion itself may not serve as a reliable
independent basis for setting compensation. 160 Nevertheless, any
attempt to set boundaries for liability rule liquidation, as opposed
to setting actual compensation rates, should note how deeply
rooted our desire for ownership stability is, at least in certain
contexts.161
A socioeconomic understanding of just compensation 162 does
not limit this foundational constraint on governmental authority
to the measure of cash equivalents for property entitlements.
Even if substantive due process offers adequate protection from
eminent domain infringement on fundamental rights, the
prohibition on takings without just compensation also should be
understood as a barrier to the incompensable liquidation of basic
159 The lack of truly broad-based community resistance to condemnations often
stems from the fact that the WTA/WTP disparity is generally finite and can be
overcome by large compensation packages given to owner occupants, as opposed to
absentee owners, in the form of generous relocation benefits. See Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 25-30, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/Papers.cfm?abstract-id=875412); infra part II.A. 1.
160 On fairness grounds, it would not make sense to pay condemnees more than
fair market price for a property if they themselves would not have paid more than
that to purchase it in the first place. Efficiency calculations based on preference
theory are somewhat more paralyzed by WTAIWTP disparities. On what basis does a
cost-benefit analyst choose WTA over WTP, or vice-versa, as the condemnee's "true"
valuation of the property? For a discussion of how the existence of endowment effects
undermines the Coase Theorem, see Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 157, at
1554-56.
161 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice between Property Rules and Liability
Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEXAS L. REV
219, 251-57 (2001).
162 1 call my understanding of eminent domain as constrained by just
compensation socioeconomic, precisely because it recognizes the relevance of
neoclassical economic analysis even as it tries to move beyond impoverished notions
of human relationships to land which have led to simplistic applications of that
paradigm. For a more comprehensive critique of reductionist tendencies in law and
economics, see Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23-25
(1989) and Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 452-53 (1974). For a description of the emerging
socioeconomic approach to law, see Robert Ashford, What is Socioeconomics?, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 5, 5-7 (2004).
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civil liberties. In more typical condemnation scenarios,
landowners' ability to enter the market and restore themselves to
a pre-taking position must factor into the determinations of
whether and how eminent domain is deployed.
C. Applying the New Theory to Urban Redevelopment
Thus far, the comparison of market thickness for condemnor
and condemnee has yielded outcomes largely consistent with
those parts of eminent domain jurisprudence that have broad
support. Public goals that involve the placement of unique
property into public trust justify the use of eminent domain,
except when fundamental rights are unduly burdened. 63 On the
other end of the spectrum, Merrill's survey and a recent update
of it have both showed a significant, if not categorical, limitation
on the use of eminent domain when public goals can be achieved
through less invasive means. 164 The true test of this Article's, or
any, theory of eminent domain, however, will be its effectiveness
in sorting out matters in which the ability of the market to
satisfy the needs of the public and the private landowner is not
so clear.
Urban redevelopment presents these ambiguities for both
condemnor and condemnee. The need to coordinate investment
in the revitalization of deteriorated neighborhoods calls for
significant governmental action, 165 although the involvement is
far more temporary than that which characterizes public trust
situations. Long-term residents face serious incompensable
losses, yet not necessarily those associated with fundamental
liberties of bodily integrity and free speech. These conflicting
needs cannot be resolved properly within the traditional property
rule/liability rule dichotomy of injunctive relief and monetary
damages. The support of stable ownership provided by property
163 See supra Part I.B.i.
164 See Merrill, supra note 40, at 109-11 (concluding that the self regulating
nature of eminent domain will ensure that it is not used if there are other "means"
by which to achieve proposed goals); Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use
Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
251, 261-66 (2003) (testing the results of Merrill's study to determine whether
eminent domain is self regulating).
165 See Paul C. Brophy and Jennifer S. Vey, Seizing City Assets: Ten Steps to
Urban Land Reform 5-8, (The Brookings Institution & CEOs for Cities, Research
Brief, 2002), available at http://www.ceosforcities.org/rethink/research/filesIbrophy
veyvacantsteps.pdf.
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rules must contend with the public need for reducing barriers to
investment coordination. Only a coherent pliability rule
structure can balance these competing concerns properly.166
1. Residents' Two-Fold Loss in Neighborhood Condemnation
If urban redevelopment agencies condemned only investment
properties that could be readily replaced, then perhaps there
would not be any need to consider less invasive means of carrying
out community revitalization goals. It may be neither efficient
nor just to protect a speculating owner from being forced to
accept the fair market value of properties needed to create a new
neighborhood.' 67 Not all types of land ownership, however, can
be so easily dismissed. Homeowners have a fundamentally
different relationship to the land they occupy.' 68 Their property
is their residence. 169 Legal literature on the value of property
rule entitlements has continuously held up the long-term
homeowner as an example of a property owner for whom a fair
market value condemnation award might fall short of restoration
to his or her pre-taking position. 170 Public health studies have
166 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 5. A pliability rule is a form of
entitlement expression that expressly blends aspects of property rules and liability
rules. See id.
167 Instead, concern might be more appropriately focused on the tenants
displaced by the widespread renovation. For a discussion of rights of non-owning
residents, see infra Part II.C.
168 See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 S. CLARA L. REV. 255,
302-03 (2006) (explaining that the political involvement and civic action of
homeowners is often based in large part on their desire to preserve the value of their
homes).
169 Homeowners, both as judgment debtors and, to a lesser extent, as
mortgagors, have long enjoyed special protection from the liability rule liquidation
known as foreclosure. See George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1289, 1289-91 (1950). For an analysis of residential ownership as a protected
international human right in the context of foreclosure, see Lorna Fox, The Idea of
Home in Law, 2 HOME CULTURES 25, 26-27 (2005).
170 See generally Fee, supra note 99, at 790-91 (listing the aspects of
homeownership not accounted for in market appraisals) Fennell, supra note 15, at
958-59, 962-67 (discussing the uncompensated increment as composed of the
subjective premium and a chance at surplus from transfer); Merrill, supra note 40,
at 82-85 (providing a possible solution to the problem of "subjective loss");
Michelman, supra note 17, at 1111-12. Radin has held up the home as the "moral
nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association." Radin, supra note 16, at
991. In Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311 (1795), Justice
Patterson observed that the government could not subsist without the use of
eminent domain; in the same way, a person looks to the home as his or her place in
the world. For a full treatment of the special legal status of the home, see Barros,
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explored both the physiological and psychological effects of the
sudden loss of home and community due to condemnation. 171 In
the mid-20th century, urban renewal uprooted thousands of
residents from their sustaining communities. 172 The belated
public backlash to those abuses instituted safeguards (discussed
below) but stopped short of giving homeowners individual veto
power over neighborhood redevelopment. 173  While urban
communities would benefit from increasing homeowner
autonomy in eminent domain, the protection must be tailored to
empower residents to support the viability of their
communities. 174
A longstanding neighborhood resident experiences a two-fold
loss in condemnation: the attachment he or she had to the home
itself and his or her connection to the surrounding community.
In many instances, long-time homeowners in a severely
supra note 168, at 255-56 (examining "the legal concept of home and how homes
often are treated more favorably by the law than other types of property").
171 See Marc A. Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of
Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359-79, 376
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1966) (discussing the fact that "[girieving for a lost home
is... a widespread and serious phenomenon following the wake of urban
dislocation"); MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK 11-14 (Random House
2004); Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Psychiatric Implications of Displacement:
Contributions From the Psychology of Place, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516, 1516-17
(1996); Marisela B. Gomez & Carlos Muntaner, Urban Redevelopment and
Neighborhood Health in East Baltimore, Maryland: The Role of Institutional and
Communitarian Social Capital, 15 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 83, 85 (2005)
(summarizing research conducted by Fullilove that "showed that residents had the
need to rebuild social ties that had become fractured through the process of
redevelopment"); Lee Rainwater, Fear and the House as Haven in the Lower Class,
32 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 23, 27-30 (1966).
172 Chester W. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L.
REV. 745, 745 (1971) (explaining that homes of "the poor, the near poor and the lower
middle class" are primarily the ones being demolished).
173 See infra Part II.A.
174 Eduardo Pefialver has recently written about the significance of "in-kind"
compensation for eminent domain, see Eduardo M. Pefialver, "In-Kind" Just
Compensation (July 14, 2006), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006
/07/in kindjust co.html, and that the dignity of the home supports one's ability to
flourish within a community. Addressing this latter point in a working paper,
Pefialver contrasts two understandings of the "home as castle" metaphor: "despotic
dominion" and "inherent dignity." Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property Metaphors and
Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle 2 (Fordham Law Legal Studies,
Research Paper No. 108, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.
cfm?abstractid=881100. Only the latter understanding, he argues, supports a check
on eminent domain abuse that reflects the proper balance of private and public
needs with regard to land. Id. at 4-5.
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deteriorated neighborhood remember the time when their
community was a vibrant, desirable place to live. Many of them
knowingly passed up the opportunity "to get out while the getting
was good." Some owners may have delayed moving out because
of the personal fondness they had for their homes themselves.
Houses serve as powerful forms of self-expression. 175 Even as
neighborhood crime increases and the physical attractiveness of
other houses declines, a homeowner might not be quick to
abandon such a home with which he or she strongly identifies.
The perseverance of those who remain through serious
decline, however, can only be explained as commitment to the
community itself.176 A house can be an expression of identity;
true community membership, on the other hand, is a constitutive
part of one's identity. As some commentators have pointed out,
communities cannot be defined solely by geographic
boundaries. 177 Even if someone's neighborhood is not his or her
only self-defining community, it is an extremely important one
for many. Residents of socially and economically isolated
communities can form bonds that are as strong as they are
central to survival. 78 As often as not, their survival of the
neglect and deterioration of their neighborhood has galvanized
remaining homeowners' commitment to the community.
In her recent book, Root Shock, Dr. Mindy Fullilove shares
the stories of those who lost their homes, communities, and
feeling of security in the mid-twentieth-century calamity that
175 Cf. Fullilove, supra note 171, at 1519 (stating that homes symbolize "the
accumulation of many relationships and much history").
176 Cf. John J. Bukowczyk, The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood:
Poletown vs. G.M. and the City of Detroit, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 64-65 (1984)
(noting that waves of arsons and the demolition of the community church and other
essential buildings displaced most Poletown members, but those who remained in
existing areas of Poletown continued organizing).
177 See GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 110-11 (1998) (criticizing local government law for defining
community solely by arbitrary geographic boundaries). The current Article's
promotion of sub-local governance structures for blight elimination is not meant to
suggest that all community can be reduced to residential neighborhood
relationships; rather, it is to acknowledge that stable ownership of land plays an
indispensable role in the sustaining of a particular, but very important, type of
community.
178 See Dennis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the
Loss of Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 702 (1992); Gomez & Muntaner, supra note
171, at 92 (stating that a community with strong community bonds "feel[s]
empowered to control its own outcome").
[Vol. 80:923
WE SHALL NOT BE MOVED
was Urban Renewal. 179 Dr. Fullilove defines root shock as "the
traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or part of one's
emotional ecosystem."180 Referencing the work of Jane Jacobs,
she describes a person's neighborhood as the setting in which
they meet basic emotional and physical needs.' 8 ' The sudden
deprivation of this context can itself be a threat to the community
member's sense of self.8 2 Throughout the work Dr. Fullilove
explores the continuing human cost of that liquidation. Her
encounters with persons who witnessed their communities
literally torn apart document their incompensable loss of sense of
place in the world.183
A homeowner's appreciations for hearth and neighborhood
can both serve as examples of surplus, the excess of consumer
valuation over the exchange value of fair market price. The
therapeutic literature concerning the victims of urban renewal
certainly brings to mind the lasting pain present in the word
"recovery." The phrase "surplus recovery," however, makes
almost no sense at all in discussions of the response to the
personal losses of both home and community that residents
displaced by urban renewal condemnations undergo. Once it is
gone, it is gone. The market cannot offer anything to replace it.
Yet, under current law, an economic development authority,
faced with the choice between a viable residential neighborhood
and an abandoned factory site for locating a new biotechnology
facility, could condemn the former instead of the latter assuring
the displaced residents that "just compensation" would prevent
them from suffering unduly.'8 4 Redevelopment experts offer
little more comfort to residents of poor neighborhoods when they
179 See FULLILOVE, supra note 171, at 7; Fullilove, supra note 171, at 1518
(sharing a story of a mining disaster that destroyed the homes of eighty percent of
residents of the town and where many "struggled to cope, but the loss of the
anchoring community left [them] adrift"). See generally Fried, supra note 171, 370-
76 (providing a detailed discussion of the grief patterns of families that have lost
their homes and have had to relocate).
180 FULLILOVE, supra note 171, at 11.
18, Id. at 17-20.
182 Id. at 20.
183 Id. at 108, 180. Her own road to the problem came through her work with
victims of the AIDS epidemic in Harlem. Id. at 108, 180.
184 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 135-37
(2004) (noting that the failure to account for such "community externalities" in
takings decisions points to an "incompleteness of current theory and doctrine").
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tell them that they are being displaced to make way for new and
beautiful homes for others, as opposed to cutting-edge
commercial activity. 8 5 A neighborhood subjected to renewal is
not a community reborn if its residents are forced out and all
connection to the past is paved over.
When the cities of Detroit and Hamtramck offered the
Poletown neighborhood as the future site of a new factory for
General Motors, there was no room in the plan for the
continuation of that community. 8 6 Generally speaking, any use
of eminent domain as an inducement of regional economic
development will subjugate the needs of the residents and
dissolve their connections to one another. 8 7 Redevelopment of
neighborhoods as viable residential areas, however, need not
result in permanent loss, even if eminent domain plays a more
vital role in clearing blight than in attracting jobs. Eminent
domain in support of reconnecting the land to adjacent
functioning housing markets need not destroy a community of
committed homeowners.
Interestingly, the need for authentic neighborhood
redevelopment may set one aspect of the homeowner's surplus
against the other. If a community's future viability depends on
its property owners pooling land resources, then a homeowner's
attachment to her property may need to give way to her desire to
see her community reborn. Her willingness to make such a
sacrifice presupposes of course that she will still be a member of
the new community.
185 Mixed-use being the mantra of current redevelopment policy, residents
facing displacement are told that their land will be remade to support both
commercial and residential uses. Marisela Gomez, Demanding a Better Deal, 144
SHELTERFORCE (2005), available at http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/144/organize.
html. The University of Baltimore Community Development Clinic is currently
representing the Save Middle East Action Committee, a nonprofit group of residents,
many of them homeowners, of an East Baltimore neighborhood being cleared to
make way for a biotechnology facility and New Urbanist housing development. For a
discussion of how the alienable Community Residency Entitlement responds to this
reality, see infra notes 270-272 and accompanying text.
186 See Bukowczyk, supra note 176, at 62 (noting that the area "slotted for
acquisition and demolition" was "more viable as a neighborhood than other parts of
the district").
187 Cf. id. at 63-64 (explaining that eminent domain and the demolition of
Poletown community institutions resulted in a general feeling of despair that
Poletown was approaching its end).
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2. The Public Need for Investment Coordination in Blighted
Areas
In an intensely subdivided urban neighborhood, owners'
property values are directly impacted by the investment
decisions of the neighboring property owners in the
community. 188 Some form of eminent domain will prove itself
indispensable to the success of strategies that involve intense,
focused public investment in the physical redevelopment of
severely deteriorated and undercrowded neighborhoods. For
such neighborhoods, reconnection to the market involves
assuring those who can choose to live elsewhere that they are
better off joining a community that is experiencing a new and
dramatic upsurge. Leveraging of private investment, therefore,
often requires intensive coordination that presupposes the
acquisition of all parcels in the target area, both the blighted and
the code compliant.18 9 Just as individual properties with many
owners can serve as exemplars of the anticommons, 190 blighted
188 WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT
45-46 (Duke Univ. Press 2001).
189 In the early 1990's, Dudley Neighbors, Inc., the nonprofit community land
trust created by the grassroots organizing efforts of the Dudley Street Neighborhood
Initiative ("DSNI"), petitioned and received from the Boston Redevelopment
Authority the power to condemn privately-owned vacant land in a large section of
the Roxbury Neighborhood. PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE
RISE AND FALL OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 141 (South End Press 1994). Although
many in the neighborhood were all too familiar with the abuse of eminent domain
authority in Boston's urban renewal days, the community decided that they needed
to reclaim this power for themselves in order to realize the transformation of the
community that DSNI's planning process was articulating. Id. at 126, 133. Rather
than force community residents into the urban renewal dilemma of being herded
into public housing complexes or being displaced altogether, DSNI wanted the
condemnation power to go to its subsidiary land trust so that there could be
permanently affordable homeownership opportunities on land made vacant by
widespread decay, arson and demolition. Id. at 120. The main reason that the
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative sought and secured eminent domain
authority from the Boston Redevelopment Authority was to be able to have "critical
mass" in its development strategy. Id. at 117-18.
190 The excessive fractionation of property more efficiently held in a unified form
has been described as anticommons. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621,
624 (1998). Although Michelman introduced the term in legal literature, it is only
relatively recent scholarship by Michael Heller that has brought "anticommons" into
frequent usage. Id. at 667-68. The tragedy of the anticommons is the inverse of the
tragedy of the commons. Id. at 623-24. Where the situation of too many persons
with unrestrained use privileges leads to overconsumption, underconsumption
plagues those properties for which too many persons have overlapping rights to
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neighborhoods also can be seen as the victims of over-
fractionation. 191
Given the pain caused by forced displacement, voluntary
land assembly may seem to be a more appropriate coordination
strategy, at least with regards to the acquisition of homeowner
property. Under such a compromise, absentee owners would be
forced to transfer their land at fair market value. Owner
occupants, however, would be "compelled" to sell their land, but
at a price they thought was fair, thereby protecting their
surplus. 192 But, just as with all such thin market land assembly
situations, a rent-seeking holdout can assert his or her
monopolistic power to dictate price and capture subsidy.193
Public developers may be forced to pay out not only the gain the
unsubsidized market would attribute to the land assembly, but
also some of the subsidy money the government and foundations
invested because of the project's social and political significance.
Having publicly subsidized developers bargain with individual
holdouts for voluntary sale does not make for sound public policy.
Even those who would argue that the speculator should
participate in the land assemblage surplus would not rush to
justify his attempts to extort public subsidies from project
officials afraid of the political consequences of acquisition failure.
block use. Id. at 639, 675. Frequently, the transaction costs involved in coordinating
these rights prevents full utilization of the resource. Id. at 674.
19, Cf. id. at 685-86 (stating that the breaking up of Indian lands by the
government led to extreme fractionation). This does not mean that overfractionation
of property interests necessarily caused, or even significantly contributed to, the
decline. Recovery and reconnection to the market, however, may require a degree of
collective action not possible without third-party coordination. Indeed, once these
barriers have been overcome, the market may support the very same lot sizes and
dispersal of ownership interests.
192 Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096 (1997) (citing an old Roman law practice
by which those who had taken another's property could keep it if they could pay the
plaintiffs estimate of its worth). Such a self-assessment was limited only by rules
against perjurious testimony. Id.
193 Cf. id. at 2093 (stating that 'liability rule[s] [are] typically adopted to
counter the monopoly position of the holder of the asset"). A genuinely inframarginal
property owner is not willing to sell his or her property for any price generally
available from buyers participating in the market. Cf. id. at 2093-94 (stating that
liability rules are adopted only when beneficial transactions may be stalled because
an individual holdout power is so large).
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3. Pliability Rule Approaches to Neighborhood Eminent
Domain
Seeing the temptation that such a system would place before
even long-suffering homeowners, legal academics have developed
more effective ways of monetizing homeowner surplus. Ellickson
suggests that supplemental damages could be awarded to
displaced long-term homeowners following a legislated schedule
based on the length of residency. 194 This approach has many of
the same cost internalization benefits of the supercompensation
provided for by the New Hampshire Mill Act. 195 Instead of
increasing compensation above market value based on the
taking's benefit to a private party, Ellickson's proposal would
provide a moderate check on condemnations that cause harm to
particularly sensitive condemnees. Although both of these
approaches innovate within the liability rule framework, neither
offers injunctive protection against overuse of eminent domain.
More recent legal scholarship has broken through a conceptual
wall separating property rule and liability rule remedies. These
responses offer resident owners legal mechanisms for blocking
certain types of condemnation without enabling them to profit
through strategic use.
Lee Anne Fennell has applied Saul Levmore's method of self-
assessed valuation 196 to the problem of condemnees at risk of
losing large surpluses. 97 She proposes that legislatures allow
landowners to adjust their own property tax bills based on their
willingness to submit their property to condemnation and private
transfer.198 By foregoing part of a tax break, they would be
assuring themselves of bonus payments over and above market-
price at the time of condemnation. 199 In rejecting the tax credit
altogether, they would effectively be purchasing an injunction
194 See Ellickson, supra note 130, at 736-37. Ellickson was discussing
displacement in the context of constructive eviction due to nuisance, but the
principles have applicability to just compensation considerations in eminent domain.
195 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
196 See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law,
68 VA. L. REV. 771, 771 (1982) (stating that self-assessment utilizes those parties
best able to accurately value the property interests while foregoing the inherent
risks of inaccuracy and corruption).
197 See Fennell, supra note 15, at 995-96.
198 Id. at 997.
199 Id.
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against any attempt to invoke eminent domain for a proposed
private use.200
In theory, Fennell's self-valuation reform separates rent-
seeking holdouts from genuinely inframarginal homeowners. By
requiring a person who claims that no amount of money could
part him from his land to put money behind his dedication, the
adjustable tax bill thwarts those who would like to play hard to
get but do not want to pay in advance for protection from
eminent domain.20 1 This analysis, however, assumes that all
such assessment decisions are made in ignorance of plans for
forthcoming condemnations.
The importance of transparency in planning and the general
inability of local governments to act with stealth make it very
likely that condemnation will be suspected long before it is
actually declared. Rent-seeking landowners may learn in
advance of a forthcoming condemnation and elect their protection
in time to cash in. Moreover, whether sincere or merely
strategic, an individual owner under Fennell's proposal has the
right to buy an absolute veto over any redevelopment project
requiring his or her land.
Fennell restricts her landowner protection to only those
instances of eminent domain for private transfer "where public
use is unclear."20 2  Yet, in these instances, eminent domain's
ability to effect curative land assembly is completely at the mercy
of individual landowners' tax payment decisions. Actually
implementing such a system may lead to an underuse of eminent
domain for blight elimination.
Recognizing the need for a form of land transfer coordination
specifically focused on the issue of excessive fragmentation of
property rights, Michael Heller and Rick Hills have devised a
governance solution. 20 3 To overcome the collective action problem
200 See id. at 997-98. Under Fennell's proposal, only governmental use and
private transfers that meet an involved balancing test would be exempt from a
landowner's right to block it. See id. at 995-98.
201 See id. at 996.
202 Id. at 995. Fennell diagnoses condemnations for private use and ownership
as chronically undercompensating the condemnees. After describing the elements of
the "uncompensated increment," she deploys regulatory takings analysis to
determine which circumstances would justify the uncompensated taking of the
"uncompensated increment." Id. at 1003-04. Landowners passing up on the tax
break would be buying this more conservative public use standard of review.
203 See Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 13-14. For a discussion of the legal
academy's embrace of governance as a progression beyond "the false dilemma
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without complete liability rule liquidation, they have drawn upon
a transaction cost solution discussed by Coase: the firm. 204
Heller and Hills propose Land Assembly Districts ("LAD") as a
new way to construct consent for land assembly purposes.205 For
a neighborhood in need of redevelopment, the local government
would take advantage of the proposed legislative reform to
declare a LAD, essentially putting a detailed purchase proposal
to a condemnee referendum.206 By imposing a collective decision-
making process similar to that available in condominium owners'
associations or labor unions, the government could allow a group
of property owners to decide whether or not to assemble their
land.207
This innovative approach straddles the line between
property rule and liability rule approaches. It is a true pliability
rule structure.208 If the stakeholders in the LAD need unanimity
to accept a purchase offer, their property rule entitlements are
preserved along with all the holdout behavior associated with
them. If, on the other hand, only a tiny fraction of LAD members
need to find an offer acceptable, to bind the whole group, the
structure looks much more like traditional eminent domain
liquidation. A simple majority vote requirement would split the
difference and "empower" the LAD member with the median
between centralized regulation and deregulatory devolution," see Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343 (2004).
204 Coase's theory of the firm recognizes that reduction of transaction costs is
the driving principle behind creation of corporate entities. See Ronald Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 385, 390-91 (1937).
205 See Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 13-15 (joining a LAD would provide
owners with collectively greater power and "some share of the gains from
assembly").
206 See id. at 13-14.
207 Id. at 23. The model for self-governance advocated by Heller and Hills, as
well as this Article, is one of direct control through referendum. For an article that
advocates supermajority resident representation on the redevelopment agency board
itself, see Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central
City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689, 752-54 (1994) (referring
to the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative as "the best known example of
resident-controlled redevelopment"). Barbara Bezdek has proposed that both the
financial benefits and ongoing control of redevelopment be given to residents
through stock ownership in private-public ventures. Barbara Bezdek, To Attain "The
Just Rewards of So Much Struggle" Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban
Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 64-68, on file
with author).
208 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 25.
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reservation price to cast the crucial vote.209
Heller and Hills offer the Land Assembly District as a
replacement for all eminent domain processes aimed at
eliminating the anticommons problem of "target
fragmentation."210  By rendering the condemnation decision-
making process corporate, as opposed to governmental or
individual, Heller and Hills have largely overcome the problem of
individual holdouts. 211 At the same time, their proposal would
not only restore some modicum of condemnee autonomy but
would also allow the condemnees to use collective bargaining to
recapture some, if not all, of their surplus.212
More importantly, the Land Assembly Districts proposal
appears to overcome the central epistemic problem of
indemnifying owners for loss of surplus. As Richard Epstein has
pointed out, an individual owner in an extreme seller's market
has a strong incentive to exaggerate the extent to which his or
her subjective valuation of the property exceeds fair market
value.21 3 In a land assembly situation, an owner asked to state
his or her subjective value of the property is being invited to
engage in holdout behavior. By comprising the potential
209 It's not clear how Heller and Hills would deal with the fact that differences
among parcels might obscure attempts to bribe just enough voters to approve the
transfer to the detriment of the undercompensated minority. Let us suppose that a
declared Land Assembly District contains sixty percent rowhouses and forty percent
fully-detached homes. The would-be developer might offer the rowhouse owners a
premium above fair market value and make up the difference by offering the owners
of the detached houses even less than fair market value. The plan might be approved
but nearly half the homeowners would have been more fully compensated by ajudicial determination of their property value in a traditional condemnation action.
For a normative analysis of vote-buying in special district elections, see Richard L.
Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1364-68 (2000).
210 Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 18.
211 Heller and Hills recognize that their process will not work in areas where the
median member (i.e., the deciding participant in a simple majority vote) is also a
holdout. These "holdout neighborhoods," as they call them, are particularly
problematic in target uniqueness situations. In their view of "target fragmentation"
and "target uniqueness", the gains in the former coming from assemblage are rightly
recaptured by the LAD members, while a neighborhood's attempt to capture the
value of their land's unique value, say for an airport site, would be as extortionate as
if carried out by a single landowner. Id. at 17-18.
212 1 describe Land Assembly Districts as increasing condemnee autonomy
rather than resident autonomy because it is not entirely clear if Heller and Hills
wish to restrict participation to homeowners. The first part of the draft article
continually refers to "landowners," id. at 3-6, while in the latter part, the term
"neighbors" is more frequent. Id. at 22-23.
213 See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 183-84.
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holdouts into a collective bargaining unit and empowering them
to fix a price by majority rule, Heller and Hills are depriving each
of them of the means by which he or she might try to acquire a
disproportionate amount of the gain from land assembly.
Heller and Hills' collective autonomy approach to
redevelopment seems to focus exclusively on the issue of the
sufficiency of the individual cash compensation offered to the
condemnees. 214  Although Land Assembly Districts offer an
effective way to calculate the monetary value of a median
landowner's consumer surplus, they do not deal with the
qualitative inadequacy of cash compensation for the loss of home
and community.215  Land Assembly Districts' distinctively
communal restoration of condemnee autonomy can truly preserve
social capital if the subject of bargaining moves away from
individual cash compensation. To build community, the
neighborhood governance approach to land assembly should
instead focus on collective bartering of homeowner properties in
exchange for public goods particularly valued by the existing
community members.
4. Enacting "Pliable" Restraints Responsive to Both Condemnor
and Condemnee Market Thickness
The proponents of the just discussed pliability approaches
find it necessary to segregate conceptually eminent domain as
used for redevelopment from eminent domain for acquisition of a
specific site for a government building or a public road. Building
on the work of Thomas Merrill, each system focuses on the
thickness of the market available to the would-be condemnor for
achieving a particular public objective. Each proposal is limited
to a particularly controversial set of eminent domain activities. 21 6
214 See Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 6-8.
215 See id. at 27 (noting that even when homeowners are paid a large premium
above fair market value, they still refuse to sell, suggesting that money can not
compensate them for their loss). Although Fennell includes the loss of autonomy as
part of her uncompensated increment, she recognizes that cash compensation for the
loss would be in "the wrong currency." Fennell, supra note 15, at 959, 961.
216 Fennell distinguishes true public use condemnations from condemnations
that could be blocked under her system by subjecting the "taking" of the
uncompensated increment to the regulatory takings test found in Penn Central.
Fennell, supra note 15, at 981-92. Heller and Hills reserve the use of Land
Assembly Districts for cases of "target fragmentation," in which investment
coordination is the primary public objective, as opposed to "target uniqueness"
situations where the condemnor faces a thin market for meeting the public objective.
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As previously noted, exploring the propriety of eminent domain
requires consideration of the thickness of both condemnor and
condemnee markets. Neither Fennell nor Heller and Hills devote
significant attention to targeting their innovations at particular
sets of condemnees. 217 Nothing about their proposals depends on
categorical differences in condemnee experiences of eminent
domain. I have illustrated how the socioeconomics of just
compensation justify attention to condemnee market thickness in
the same way that the Economics of Public Use showed the
relevance of condemnor market thickness. Having examined
categories for each, we are now ready to map out the full range of
possible interactions between "public use" and "just
compensation" and insert appropriate entitlement protections.
The following chart arranges these various outcomes along the
condemnor necessity and condemnee compensation axes:
FIGURE 1: MAPPING AVAILABILITY OF EMINENT DOMAIN BASED ON
CONDEMNOR & CONDEMNEE NEED FOR LAND
Just Compensation SURPLUS IMPLICATES SURPLUS NOT No SURPLUS OR
& Condemnee FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT RECOVERABLE SURPLUS
Market Thickness-- NOT RECOVERABLE THROUGH MARKET RECOVERABLE
THROUGH MARKET (RESIDENT THROUGH
Public Necessity & HOMEOWNERS) MARKET (LAND
Condemnor Market INVESTORS)
Thickness4
Public Trust 218  Eminent Domain ("ED") ED permitted; impact ED permitted
prohibited absent study required as to
compelling interest site selection
219
Subsidy Inducement ED prohibited ED with impact study ED permitted
for Regional Economic only if compelling
Development public need for land
acquisition;
220
otherwise community
governance
Blighted Area ED prohibited ED permitted only ED permitted
Investment through community
Coordination governance
Heller & Hills, supra note 15, at 17-18.
217 Fennell consistently describes her would-be condemnees as "property
owners" and 'landowners." Fennell, supra note 15, at 995, 997, 999. As previously
noted, Heller and Hills are less clear in their draft article about which stakeholders
control the Land Assembly District. See supra note 212.
218 To fit in this category, the public objective behind the condemnation must
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Resident homeowners should have the authority not only to
help create but also to ratify the redevelopment plan. Moreover,
even if by collectively subjecting themselves to eminent domain
they necessarily lose those surpluses associated with their
individual parcels, their relationship to the land and, more
importantly, to one another, should be preserved. As shown in
the second part of the Article, this equilibrium achieved through
the targeted subjection of eminent domain to community
governance can be established by statutory reforms to existing
structures. The resident ratification requirement, which I call
Homestead Community Consent, can be built into the community
planning requirements already featured in many of the state
statutes delegating eminent domain authority to the special
public and quasi-public authorities that tend to be the biggest
users of it for redevelopment purposes. 221 Preservation of those
surpluses flowing from the community can be achieved by an
amendment to federal relocation laws to guarantee long-term
residents comparable housing on the same land that the
homeowners among them collectively relinquished. 222
necessitate the placement of a real property interest into some form of public trust.
Strictly speaking, a government may be able to meet this test and still enjoy a
market thick with equally suitable sites. Nevertheless, the condemning authority
should have discretion as to which property to select subject to an impact study
process if potential condemnees as a group tend to face recognizable, incompensable
losses.
219 John Fee has also suggested that any condemnation of homeowner land be
preceded by an impact statement process. Fee, supra note 99, at 801-02. For an
example of a proposed administrative process using cost-benefit analysis of
displacement inducing condemnations, see Adam Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an
Economic Development Tool: A Proposal To Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001
L. REV. MICH. ST. UNIV. DETROIT COLL. OF L. 901, 940-41 (2001). At the 2005
Brigham-Kanner Conference, Tim Iglesias presented his ideas for an Eminent
Domain Impact Statement to address the "Egregious Eight" threats to public
interests. Timothy Iglesias, The Egregious Eight: Reforming Eminent Domain To
Protect Public Interests (Oct. 29, 2005) (handout on file with author).
220 Given that the public purpose of economic development does not per se
require the acquisition of land, the authority would have to establish both that the
proposed development project needs the identified land in particular and that no
other, less particular projects could substitute for the identified project in achieving
economic development. Otherwise, the authority would be forced to bargain with
the community collectively to buy them out. See infra part II.C.3.
221 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-600, 7-603 (1999); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-4-2, 8-4-4 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-
504 (2006); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1709 (2003).
222 For a discussion of this proposed Community Residency Entitlement, see
infra Part II.C.2.
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II. "JUST LIKE A TREE THAT'S PLANTED BY THE WATER...":
THE RIGHT OF RESIDENTS BOTH TO RENEW AND TO REMAIN
A workable theory of eminent domain will validate broadly
accepted conclusions as to the legitimacy of eminent domain in
straightforward situations as well as persuasively sort out more
controversial cases. Merrill conducted a review of more than
three hundred judicial opinions to show that courts were already
interpreting "public use" in a manner consistent with his basic
and refined models of condemnor market thickness.223 Although
his article generally supported the broad reading of "public use"
to include a wide variety of permissible governmental ends, he
also illustrated how his call for increased attention to the
availability of alternatives to eminent domain as a means of
achieving those ends would rein in abusive condemnation
practices. 224
Since the current Article's extension of that approach into
just compensation has pointed out the suitability of legislative
and administrative protections, a review of eminent domain in
the urban redevelopment context should-and, in fact, does-
reveal examples of statutory and regulatory reforms designed to
protect condemnees from significant uncompensated losses.
These attempts at addressing the inequities of condemnation
offer foundations for future reforms. Furthermore, a market
thickness examination of the public objectives behind urban
redevelopment outlines room for alternatives to traditional
eminent domain. The overlap then between condemnees'
remaining unmet needs and local authorities' ability to meet
public goals-without unchecked ability to compel land
transfers-provides fertile ground for the compromises necessary
to transform eminent domain into an appropriate instrument of
authentic community development.
Forty years ago, public dissatisfaction with the use of
eminent domain for urban redevelopment inspired a series of
reforms that continue to protect property occupants today. 225
223 Merrill, supra note 40, at 94-97. As previously noted, this study was recently
replicated. Wilk, supra note 164, at 257-61 (evaluating Merrill's initial study to
reveal any relevant changes that have taken place in the courts' analysis of public
use); see also infra note 108 and accompanying text.
224 Merrill, supra note 40, at 69-71.
225 See, e.g., Paul Bass and Douglas W. Rae, Eminent Disdain, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2005, at A13 (providing an example of public dissatisfaction with the use of
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Federal relocation assistance and state planning legislation
offered comparatively little additional autonomy for absentee
owners faced with condemnation. Instead these important but
incomplete changes targeted those most devastated by eminent
domain: resident stakeholders facing displacement. Their focus
on those most personally attached to the land provides the
foundation for the reforms still needed today.
A. The Unfinished Work of the Revolt Against Urban Renewal
Urban planning experts can adduce any number of cogent
arguments for the appropriateness of eminent domain as part of
a given redevelopment project and still be silenced by the
inevitable historical rejoinder: urban renewal. The quarter-
century that followed the enactment of the National Housing Act
of 1949 witnessed the discarding of many vital urban
communities to make way for sterile single-use projects that
frequently never reached completion. 226 The populist backlash
against urban renewal made urban redevelopment experts much
more sensitive to public relations issues and led to the birth of
the contemporary community development movement's emphasis
on resident empowerment. 227 Despite a governmental agenda to
promote style over substance, the specific responses to the
eminent domain abuses of the urban renewal era suggest
important future limitations on the ends, means and
consequences of condemnation.
1. Undercompensation and the Uniform Relocation Act
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that "jj]ust compensation
rests on equitable principles and it means substantially that the
owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would
have been if his property had not been taken."228  For all the
eminent domain in 1959 and explaining that reforms are still needed today).
226 FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 123, 133-47 (noting how minority
communities were displaced in order to make way for large, single-use projects, such
as highways); FRUG, supra note 177, at 133-35.
227 See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative
Planning, 3 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 709, 713-14 (2000).
228 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,
304 (1923); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923);
Jeremy P. Hopkins, Just Compensation: Elementary Principles and Considerations
To Ensure the Property Owner Is Made Whole, in ALI-ABA, CONDEMNATION 101:
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outrage over the disregard of the "public use" clause, more than
one private property advocate has pointed out that there might
be comparatively little concern over eminent domain if
condemnors provided compensation that condemnees openly
acknowledged to be just.229  By largely restricting required
compensation to the value of the property taken, the courts have
abandoned any pretense that just compensation entails full
condemnee indemnification. Victims of urban renewal frequently
received little or no meaningful recompense for their relocation
costs and their severance from the land and the community it
supported.230 Urban redevelopment turned a page with the
passage of federal legislation in 1970 to address the former. The
problem of the loss of community, however, still preoccupies
those who wish to defend, improve, or eliminate the use of
eminent domain in urban redevelopment. 231
While appropriately rewarding holdouts might seem complex
and elusive, urban renewal reformers found no such difficulties
in reimbursing relocation costs. In enacting the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Properties Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970 ("Uniform Relocation Act" or "URA"), Congress
provided for monetary and service assurances of proper
relocation to victims of federally financed eminent domain
condemnation. 23 2 If the condemning authority could not establish
the existence of comparable replacement housing233  that
FUNDAMENTALS OF CONDEMNATION LAW AND LAND VALUATION (2006).
229 See Fennell, supra note 15, at 960 & n.13.
230 See Hartman, supra note 172, at 749-50 (outlining the early evolution of
relocation adjustment payments, which in 1956 only provided a "reimbursement for
moving expenses" at "a maximum of $100 per family").
231 See Hellegers, supra note 219, at 941-42 (2001). This Article proposes the
required completion of a community impact statement prior to redevelopment. Id. at
956.
232 42. U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2000).
233 The term "comparable replacement dwelling" means any dwelling that is:
(A) decent, safe, and sanitary; (B) adequate in size to accommodate the
occupants; (C) within the financial means of the displaced person;
(D) functionally equivalent; (E) in an area not subject to unreasonable
adverse environmental conditions; and (F) in a location generally not less
desirable than the location of the displaced person's dwelling with respect
to public utilities, facilities, services, and the displaced person's place of
employment.
42 U.S.C. § 4601(10); Dean v. Martinez, 336 F. Supp. 2d 477, 491 (D. Md. 2004)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 4601(10)).
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relocatees could afford, even with their stipends, then the agency
could itself provide "housing of last resort. '234
The URA facilitated, without dictating, responses to the
compensation gaps of market land valuation. Not only did
relocation costs have to be paid, but there also had to be planning
to make sure that persons could use the money to regain what
they had lost due to the condemnation. The Uniform Relocation
Act only required that the condemning agency produce a plan
that the funding agency found satisfactory; 235 and failed to give
condemnees, either directly or indirectly through meaningful
judicial review, any means to control relocation. 236 Yet, it gave
condemning agencies a public relations kit for dealing with
anxious residents of redevelopment districts.237
By offering money above and beyond the fair market value of
the condemned properties, redevelopment officials can erode the
base for any organized discontent. Ellickson recognized the URA
system as a conduit for making bonus payments to soften
opposition to major capital projects. 238 In Baltimore, the recent
expansion of an internationally reknowned medical campus into
an adjacent deteriorated neighborhood has occasioned an
instance of "supplemental" URA benefits to induce condemnee
cooperation. 239
234 See 42 U.S.C. § 4626 (2000); 49 C.F.R. § 24.404 (2005).
235 42 U.S.C. § 4630 (2000).
236 See Dean, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 490-91 (stating that HUD's statutory
obligation to displaced tenants does not require the agency to "affirmatively provide"
comparable housing).
237 For a recent discussion of how relocation assistance is used to quiet
resistance to eminent domain, see Garnett, supra note 159, at 25-30.
238 See Ellickson, supra note 130, at 737 n.195.
239 In 2002, Baltimore's City Council amended East Baltimore's urban renewal
to authorize the condemnation of thirty acres of land in a neighborhood known as
Middle East to make way for a mixed-use project featuring a biotechnology
industrial park in the area adjacent to Johns Hopkins Hospital. Eric Siegel, City
Acquiring 70 Houses in Step Towards Biotech Park, BALT. SUN, Dec. 26, 2002, at lB.
In addition to replacement housing assistance payments required by the URA, both
homeowners and renters are eligible for "supplemental benefits." See E. BALT. DEV.,
INC., RELOCATION PLAN FOR E. BALT. DEV. PROJECT 12-25 (2004). Funds for these
extra payments are being provided by the Annie E. Casey Foundation and Johns
Hopkins University, the latter of which will be the anchor tenant for the biotech
park. Given that a homeowner has far stronger standing to obstruct a condemnation
proceeding than a month-to-month tenant would, it is not surprising that the
additional benefits for homeowners greatly exceed those going to the tenants.
Although the Uniform Relocation Act is the most substantial governmental reform
brought about by the backlash against urban renewal, its orientation remains
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The URA provided a means of appeasing condemnees with
individual cash payments. It also recognized that cash by itself
was insufficient. Even if the government had to build substitute
facilities or "housing of last resort," persons displaced by
federally funded condemnation activity had an entitlement to in-
kind compensation, that is, comparable housing in the same
metropolitan area.240 This requirement applies equally to all
manner of land seizures. Authorities who build highways are
just as bound by its provisions as those who wish to plan the next
NASCAR mecca.241 Those long-term residents whose homes are
taken to make homes for others, however, should not be satisfied
with comparable housing that allows them to keep their jobs.
After redevelopment is completed, they should be entitled to last
resort housing on the same land they all called home prior to
condemnation. Even if they do not regain the houses they
valued, they would be able to move forward together as a new
community.
2. Imposed Conformity and Community Participation in
Planning
Urban renewal stands out among twentieth century
instances of public and private oppression of marginalized
communities. Confident in the superiority of their modern drawn
cityscapes over the tangled, haphazard slums they wished to
clear, urban renewal experts failed to see how reasonable minds
would not welcome their proposals. Federal planning
requirements slowed the process somewhat, but did not require
any substantial community consultation.242 The urban renewal
cadre of downtown business leaders and planning experts
eliminated chaos and imposed modern progress in its place.243
focused on assuring the feasibility of redevelopment projects.
240 42 U.S.C. § 4626 (2000); see also 49 C.F.R. § 24.404(b) (2005).
241 Indeed, because highway construction is the main occasion for federally
funded eminent domain, the Department of Transportation, not the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, issues regulations under the URA. 7 FED. PROC.,
L. ED. § 14:327 (2006).
242 Promoters recognized as early as 1954 the need to make urban renewal more
"workable" by encouraging citizen participation in redevelopment planning. See
Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of
Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 870 &
n.25 (2000).
243 See MALLOY, supra note 121, at 103-04, 121 (using downtown Indianapolis
as an example of an area where expensive revitalization projects such as the
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Using funding for highway, university, office space, or
stadium projects, condemnation planning officials deployed
eminent domain to eliminate demographic as well as code
enforcement crises.244  The continuing influx of African-
Americans into aging urban districts led planners to target their
neighborhoods for redevelopment. 245  Redevelopment officials
accommodated, ratified, and reinforced white citizens' general
unwillingness to live in neighborhoods with sizeable black
populations by shepherding poorer condemnees into public
housing projects. 246 Building out from the Euclidean zoning
approach of segregating different classes of land use, urban
renewalists used eminent domain, highways, and public housing
towers to compartmentalize minorities and minimize any conflict
that might have come with diversity. 247
In the Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs,
an activist fighting urban renewal in New York City's Greenwich
Village, 248 offered a critique of the monolithic approach to
planning that made urban renewal so barren. 249 Her vision of
city life, which would be well-described as "the being together of
strangers,"250 called upon planners to celebrate, rather than
construction of two office buildings, a hotel, and a major sports arena have taken
place).
244 A decade before the Poletown project, the city of Hamtramck used eminent
domain to remove African-American residents. See William A. Fischel, The Political
Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of
Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 929, 938 n.40 (2004). See generally
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (arguing that the black ghetto was
created by whites during the first half of the twentieth century in order to isolate
growing urban black populations, and how this segregation continues today).
245 See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 123, at 28-29, 52.
246 Gerald Frug refers to this, in the words of Arnold Hirsch, as "the making of
the second ghetto." See FRUG, supra note 177, at 133; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
244.
247 See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 123, at 28-30, 39-40 (showing that in
order to minimize the conflict that might arise from the cohabitation of white and
black citizens, urban renewalists would not do business with African-Americans,
and would price newly built apartments high, in order to keep African-Americans
out of the area).
248 See Herbert Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 538 (James Q. Wilson ed., MIT Press 1966).
249 See generally JANE JACOBS, DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
(Random House 1993) (1961) (critiquing current planning policies that, Jacobs
claims, were destroying existing inner-city communities, and advocating a "mixed-
use aesthetic" that preserves the uniqueness of individual neighborhoods).
250 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237
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suppress, the diversity of activities and uses that support the
"sidewalk ballet"251 she observed on her own street. 252 Diversity
of activity is the key to promoting neighborhood vitality, as
Jacobs saw it.253 As natural generators of diversity, cities needed
plans that facilitated, rather than stifled, stabilizing
heterogeneity. 254 Officials and experts would not be able to
conceive such plans without active citizen participation.
Just as with relocation assistance, community consultation
also became part of urban renewal's standard operating
procedure. Just five years after its enactment, the Housing Act
of 1949 was amended to require citizen consultation in order to
make redevelopment "workable."255  The creation of citizen
advisory groups was a fairly transparent public relations ploy
that came to serve as a negative example for the community
development movement that would arise in urban renewal's
wake.256  As Audrey McFarlane notes, in summarizing the
leading theoretical analysis of governmental efforts to increase
community involvement, "participation is meaningful only to the
extent that one has the power to affect the outcome of the
development process. 257
With the flourishing of the community development
movement, community participation in even large scale
revitalization projects has evolved considerably.258  New
Urbanism in particular places broadly inclusive design charrettes
at the center of its approach to planning.259 Yet, for urban
(Princeton University Press 1990); see also JACOBS, supra note 249, at 38.
251 JACOBS, supra note 249, at 66.
252 Id. at 66-70; see also YOUNG, supra note 250, at 237-40 (noting that in a city
with diversity of activity, one can see a variety of people interacting with one
another on the streets).
253 JACOBS, supra note 249, at 531; see also YOUNG, supra note 250, at 237-40
(noting that when there is diversity of activity, residents tend to have more
commitment to and care for their neighborhoods).
254 JACOBS, supra note 249, at 531-32; see also YOUNG, supra note 250, at 238-
40 (arguing that in the ideal city, groups will overlap and intermingle without
becoming homogenous).
255 See McFarlane, supra note 242, at 870.
256 See id. at 870-72.
257 Id. at 920-22; Sherry Arnstein, Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen
Participation, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EFFECTING COMMUNITY CHANGE 69,
72-73 (Edgar S. Cahn & Barry Passett eds., 1971).
258 See Salsich, supra note 227, at 709-10 (describing the use of new community
planning techniques that are designed to "engage a broader segment of the
community" in the development process).
259 See id. at 711 n.13; Charles C. Bohl, New Urbanism and the City: Potential
[Vol..80:923
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redevelopment programs such as HOPE VI, ultimate and
complete control still remains locked at the top. 260 As with
supplemental cash compensation to residents, public relations
oriented community consultation reforms have succeeded in
keeping urban redevelopment projects "workable."
3. Two New Forms of Residency Protection
Two complementary statutory reforms are needed to
enhance the protection of residents from eminent domain in
urban redevelopment. First, community members should not
have any of their substantial rights of residency liquidated by
eminent domain until they have approved the redevelopment
plan for their neighborhood. This Homestead Community
Consent requirement would best be enacted as an amendment to
redevelopment planning requirements in state enabling
statutes.261 It would explicitly exempt condemnations for true
public ownership and possession, and even those for transfer to
private common carriers that guaranteed long-term public
benefits in exchange for their required use of the land.262
To ensure that resident planners are confident that they are
creating a community for themselves and their long-time
neighbors, I further propose that federal and state relocation
protections be reformed to ensure that long-term residents of
redevelopment areas be given an alienable right to comparable
replacement housing in the new development. Like its
Homestead Community Consent partner, the Community
Residency Entitlement would not apply to traditional invocations
Applications and Implications for Distressed Inner-City Neighborhoods, 11 HOUS.
POL'Y DEBATE 761, 765 (2000). Ironically, New Urbanists have built their best
known sizable developments away from America's older cities. See id. at 781
(explaining that "the type of urbanism required to attract a diverse group of renters
and home buyers today" is not that which was found in America's "older cities").
Land assembly in previously developed communities has proven too difficult. The
most well-known New Urbanist developments in the inner-city have been
constructed on the smaller pieces of land left behind by the HOPE VI program's
demolition of public housing projects. See id. at 768-70.
260 See Susan Bennett, The Possibility of a "Beloved Place" Residents and
Placemaking in Public Housing Communities, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 259, 304
(2000).
261 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-600, 7-603 (1999); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-4-2, 8-4-4 (2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 99.820 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-
504 (2006); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1709 (2003).
262 For discussion of this "public trust" exemption, see supra notes 110-20 and
accompanying text.
2006]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of eminent domain for true public needs as described earlier. For
revitalization projects, however, these two protections together
create a land acquisition, redevelopment, and relocation that is
not only "workable" but also genuinely constructive of
community.
B. Homestead Community Consent
1. Genuine Community Participation Entails Homestead
Stakeholder Consent
In restoring community autonomy without facilitating
individual holdouts, the Homestead Community Consent reform
would foster a genuine dialogue between redevelopment officials
and resident stakeholders. Although contemporary planners are
steeped in group facilitation techniques to make community
participation in planning feasible, no amount of openness in
communication style can create decision-making power where
none exists. 263 In order for resident planners to "buy-in," their
approval must have more than mere public relations value. It
must be determinative of the plan's authorization. 264 Even if
their sanction is not the only one needed, they should not be
forced to yield their individual homes until they themselves have
envisioned and ratified the future of their neighborhood.265
The dialogue between these residents and those proposing
redevelopment would tend to prioritize public goods valued by
the existing residents, but not to the exclusion of the investment
263 See McFarlane, supra note 242, at 920-22, 925; Arnstein, supra note 257, at
72-73.
264 Although the referendum mechanism is offered here as indispensable to any
meaningful community consent to the exchange of resident land for a redevelopment
plan, a parliamentary system of decision-making need not dominate the discussions
that lead to the plan. For a critique of Robert's Rules of Order in favor of consensus
building, see LAURENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 3-5 (1999). Advocates of
charrettes for the creation of community plans have identified consensus building as
a preferred mode of discourse. See JAMES A. SEGEDY & BRADLEY E. JOHNSON, THE
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARETTE HANDBOOK: VISIONING & VISUALIZING YOUR
NEIGHBORHOOD'S FUTURE, http://www.louisville.edu/org/sun/planning/char.html
(last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
265 In most cases, the homestead community would consist entirely of
neighborhood homeowners, including cooperative tenants and condominium unit
owners. As we have just seen, however, rent regulated tenants would also have the
long-term property rights normally extinguishable by eminent domain. They, too,
would participate as homestead stakeholders.
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coordination that would re-establish connections between the
neighborhood and the city as a whole. A community's culture
and history of struggle and survival could be expressed in the
public art.266 Murals, sculptures, and green spaces could reflect a
community that still lives rather than regretfully memorializing
one that had to be put out of its misery. As residents and experts
alike wrestled with market realities, features that would draw
newcomers to the area, as residents, merchants, and customers,
would also have to be acknowledged.
Although the approval vote requirement would give
homeowners unusual authority, the discussion between officials
and residents would not necessarily be one way. While the
homestead community would collectively control land resources
vital to the project, the redevelopment officials would presumably
control where and how to spend the financial subsidies for any
project.267 If community residents were completely happy with
their neighborhood's present condition, they might with one voice
tell the experts to go spend their money elsewhere. Indeed a
fundamentally healthy neighborhood would not need the use of
eminent domain to bring about its revitalization. For this
reason, the Homestead Community Consent reform would act as
a procedural check on the overuse of redevelopment-focused
eminent domain. Homeowners in a severely distressed
neighborhood, however, will know better than anyone how much
help their community needs. If approached in the spirit, but not
just the spirit, of partnership, these survivors will get to work on
reconnecting the neighborhood with the city around it.
2. Corporate Alienability of the Land Promotes Community
Strength
As with the Land Assembly District process, HCC would
frustrate both genuine and bluffing individual holdouts. Persons
who refused to consider giving up their current home for a wide
range of improvements that would benefit all residents would
presumably be so out of step with the community mainstream as
266 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 189, at 241-42.
267 Audrey McFarlane shows how difficult it has been for meaningful
community participation to be structured into the administration of federal
community development funding, a resource to which neighborhood-based
organizations have not had direct access since the passage of the Green Amendment
in the late 1960s. See McFarlane, supra note 242, at 874.
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to be ineffectual in its deliberations. Individuals who wished to
engage in strategic bargaining for personal gain would find even
less opportunity in a community decision-making process that
focused on the community's redesign.
By making resident approval essential to the land assembly
process, HCC develops social capital broadly recognized as
essential to urban redevelopment. Although residents could
express their views through elected representatives, the direct
democracy approach of HCC draws upon community organizing's
roots in the labor movement. Saul Alinsky wrote that "a People's
Organization can arise only from the efforts of the people
themselves."268  Redevelopment, by its nature, will drastically
change a severely distressed neighborhood.269 Only if returning
residents have themselves produced the new community will
they ever be able to rejoin it and call it their own. The inevitable
conflicts and compromises with officials will only build the
connection to the neighborhood vision for which they had to fight.
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative's combined
emphasis on resident planning and community legal control of
land resources has made their organization a model for
community-based development in distressed neighborhoods. °2 7
The Homestead Community Consent process, by enhancing and
communalizing residents' protection in urban redevelopment,
creates a forum for this same kind of transformative conflict
resolution. By giving residents a legal right to hold on to what
they have, this resident control proposal offers them an
opportunity to let it go for something that is better and that is
truly theirs.
C. Community Residency Entitlement
1. Relocation to Truly Comparable Housing Entails the Right
To Rejoin the Community
As discussed above, the Uniform Relocation Act was enacted
to ensure some minimum provision for those displaced by the
268 SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS 175 (1946).
269 See Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPE VI: A Vital Tool For
Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 527,
528-29 (2001).
270 ELISE M. BRIGHT, REVIVING AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN NEIGHBORHOODS, 77-
110 (2000); see also supra notes 135 & 189.
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federally funded use of eminent domain authority. Whether a
highway, an office complex, or a mixed-income residential
development forced resident condemnees out, they were all
entitled to benefit from the condemning agency's plan to facilitate
their relocation to comparable replacement housing. There is no
reason why a private residential redevelopment availing itself of
eminent domain authority should not have to offer eventual
relocation into onsite replacement housing just because such a
requirement would not apply to a highway project.
As shown above, the public need for the specific route of a
highway and, thereby, for permanent displacement trumps the
right of the resident to preserve his or her unique relationship to
his or her home, the land and the community subsisting on that
land. 271 The homeowner forced to make way for someone else's
private residence receives no such justification. Nothing about
the public benefit in such a case is fundamentally incompatible
with the resident's right to permanent onsite replacement
housing.272
Truly comparable housing is not just about square footage
and proximity to one's place of employment. 273 It also involves
the ability to maintain community relationships developed over
decades. For transfers to private parties that do not constitute
271 Although the proposal for community preservation that I offer is
incompatible with redevelopment projects that make no provision for residential
redevelopment of the condemned plan, Parchomovsky and Siegelman propose
complete relocation of a displaced community to a different site as the type of in-kind
relief that should be generally required by any regime that claims the name of just
compensation. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 184, at 138. Their Selling
Mayberry article examines a rural case; the current piece focuses on urban
redevelopment. The divergence of the two proposals probably reflects the different
sets of constraints on, and possibilities for, relocation of urban and rural
communities.
272 That is to say, the publicly stated objective of bringing newly designed and
built housing to the area does not conflict with residents returning post-
redevelopment. If, however, the land is being seized to scatter an unwanted
population, a community residency entitlement would help expose and, to some
extent, thwart such practices. For a discussion of Urban Renewal as "Negro
removal," see FRIEDEN AND SAGALYN, supra note 123, at 28-30; ROBERT HALPERN,
REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES To
ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 67-71 (Columbia Univ. Press 1995);
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 244, at 56; Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public
Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21
YALE L. & POLy REV. 1, 47 (2003).
273 See supra notes 232-40 and accompanying text (summarizing existing
guarantees under the URA).
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the necessary establishment of a public trust, federal and state
relocation should guarantee displacees the right to re-establish
their memberships in their original communities. If the "needs"
of such projects are not compatible with actually honoring such
guarantees, then the market, rather than the agency, should be
allowed to establish just compensation.
2. Individual Alienability of the Right To Rejoin the
Community Fosters Efficient Valuation
Even long-time residents of the neighborhood will value the
right to return to the redeveloped community differently. For
some, the transformed community, even if it includes many of
their neighbors and features many improvements that they
approved, will just not be the same. Others may have been
planning on leaving the neighborhood anyway. Many of those
who have survived its hard times, however, may simply not be
denied the opportunity to take part in its rebirth by anyone or for
any reason. To facilitate productive planning, the Community
Residency Entitlement proposal would allow redevelopment
managers to buy out as many residents as they need to make
permanent replacement housing offers to the rest.
For instance, let us imagine a distressed neighborhood that
had 300 long-term households in an area of 1000 evenly
distributed, identical rowhouse parcels. The planners, let us
suppose, have a homestead stakeholder approved plan that uses
twenty-five percent of the land for the expansion of a neighboring
private university and reduces the density of the remaining land
to 600 townhouses. Assuming that the project's aspirations to
attract higher income residents limited the amount of housing
that would be affordable to most of the original residents to 200
units, the planners could make buyout offers until they had
purchased 100 Community Residency Entitlement releases.274
City officials wishing to use non-exempt eminent domain for
projects that offer even less benefits, however, to the community
274 If they wished to pay everyone the same amount for giving up the right to
onsite permanent replacement housing, the planners could hold a sealed offer
auction in which the 100th lowest buyout offer would be the payout for the ninety-
nine offers below it as well. Conducting an auction would not obligate the developers
to make any payments; such auctions would be another form of group bargaining,
albeit one in which the entitlement holders are competing with one another to sell
their rights to return to the new community.
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would apparently face an insurmountable barrier in the
Homestead Community Consent phase. A "holdout
neighborhood" would not have to be idiosyncratic at all to turn
down a redevelopment plan that flattened all their homes solely
to make for a "big box" retail center to serve adjacent
communities to which they may or may not relocate. There
would be nothing in it for them so there would be no reason to
hand over their land. Exemptions for public trust creation would
protect against a particularly obstructionist community holding
an entire city hostage for a true public necessity but would not do
so for an all too dispensable commercial use. With the
combination of these proposed reforms, non-residential
redevelopers would have to pay for the privilege of permanent
displacement.
Although the proposed Homestead Community Consent
procedures would prevent city officials favoring the development
from procuring individual votes, they would still have a great
deal of flexibility in timing the buyout of all the Community
Residency Entitlement rights. 275 For those projects for which
planners would prefer to have no residential component at all,
the planning process requirements should allow officials to
include a 100% CRE buyout in the plan to be approved by the
Homestead Community, as long as all residents holding
Community Residency Entitlement under the revised URA were
allowed to vote as well. 276 Just as with the Land Assembly
District process, if the median resident is satisfied as to the
compensation offered, the "big box" would be built.277
275 The presumed difficulty in bargaining with a so-called "holdout" community
may be overblown. In their case study of the environmentally occasioned relocation
of the residents of Cheshire, Ohio, Siegelman and Parchomovsky focus their efforts
on trying to account for the relative ease of the transaction. Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 183, at 91-92.
276 In the 100% buyout option, the Homestead Community Consent and
Community Residency Entitlement processes would collapse into a single procedure
all but indistinguishable from the Land Assembly District system, except as to the
identity of those included. It would, however, have the advantage of decoupling the
liquidation of resident surpluses from the pricing of individual properties. This
separation would frustrate attempts to offer certain residents more than others in
order to buy their votes. Relative differentials in payouts could still be pre-
established by legislation according to criteria such as length of residency as
suggested by Ellickson. Ellickson, supra note 130, at 735-37.
277 Of course, under the theory I have presented in the first part of the Article, a
community governance approach would not be mandated if the local authority could
establish that local economic survival necessitated the taking of the identified land.
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D. Anticipating Objections
1. Why Autonomy for Resident Owners Only?
Although I have already set out my main justifications for
the elevation of residency as a strong property rule entitlement,
American law's general hostility toward any differential legal
treatment based on status warrants a closer look at why
homeowners and other long-term residents should receive
apparently preferential treatment over others affected by urban
redevelopment. As to the Homestead Community Consent, the
proper comparison is between resident condemnees and non-
resident condemnees. HCC focuses on the forced acquisition of
property rights recognized in eminent domain proceedings.
Month-to-month tenants, although residents who may be
displaced by the condemnation, are not themselves condemnees.
They do not have cognizable interests in the land that is being
taken. 278  The CRE portion of the proposal grants special
relocation rights to condemnees and other long-term residents
that will not be granted to more recent arrivals or to non-resident
displacees such as small business owners.
Although rhetoric assailing eminent domain abuse almost
universally invokes the homeowner as the paradigmatic victim,
small business owners are also mentioned. 279 The Uniform
Relocation Act addresses many of the compensable losses
suffered by commercial condemnees, but, businessmen, like
homeowners, can form an attachment to their properties as well.
See supra note 219.
278 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.02[6][i] (3rd ed. 2006). Here I would
distinguish, however, between interests in land that are recognized as deserving of
equitable protection and those that are also regarded as requiring compensation in
eminent domain. Long-standing tenancies protected by rent regulation have been
held to be deserving of the equity of redemption under New York Law, as they have
many of the attributes of home ownership with regard to security of tenure. 248
Sherman Ave, Corp. v. Coughlin, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 1999, at 26 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1999). Yet, a New York appellate court has also held that such statutory
tenancies are not compensable in condemnation. Dormitory Auth. v. Davis,
276 A.D.2d 284, 285, 713 N.Y.S.2d 873, 873 (1st Dep't 2000). For purposes of
Homestead Community Consent, statutory tenants should be included in the
referendum with homeowners because they too have a relationship with the land
that equity would protect through injunctive relief, as against private parties.
279 See Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 491, 497 (James Q. Wilson ed., MIT Press 1966);
Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV.
207, 221-22 (2004).
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Proprietors can spend the better part of a lifetime developing a
business, investing themselves as well as their capital into its
growth. Condemnation of lease 280 or ownership rights, however,
will not devastate these personal attachments as they do in the
residential context. 281 While a very small minority of businesses
will be so dependent on their unique location that they will not
be able to function at all, most will be able to use the
compensation provided to adjust and survive unimpaired. 282
A strong interconnection with the surrounding community
will also foster effective representation for a business in the
Homestead Community Consent process. If the business has
drawn its customers from all over the city, but was strongly
identified with the neighborhood, the residents will seek to
provide for its return to the redeveloped area. Likewise, if the
business served mainly the residents themselves, the owner
should feel confident in his customers' advocacy. For other
businesses, condemnation and relocation themselves should not
prove unduly burdensome.
For severely distressed neighborhoods, the failure of either of
the reforms to directly empower short-term residents is of
greater concern. Personal crises and bad housing conditions
often require poor tenants to move frequently, sometimes in and
out of neighboring communities. The critiques of urban renewal
280 It should be noted that a great many small business persons lease rather
than own their land. Although their leases may be of such a length as to qualify
them as condemnees, the need to be mobile and focus investment on operating, as
opposed to real estate, capital illustrates the relative insignificance of stable land
tenure for many merchants.
281 See Fee, supra note 99, at 792-93. But see Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the
World Trade Center: An Argument for the Applicability of Personhood Theory to
Commercial Property Ownership and Use, 109 PENN STATE L. REV. 815, 826-28
(2005) (noting that 9/11 memorial efforts illustrate how commercial property can be
"de-commodified").
282 Mere survival may seem a poor excuse for not increasing protection. Frank
Michelman, however, articulates the case for such an approach to determining the
availability of specific relief against eminent domain.
[Wihat one primarily has a right to is the maintenance of the conditions of
one's fair and effective participation in the constituted order .... Loss-
even great loss-of the economic value of one's [holdings may] not as such
violate those conditions. What does, perhaps, violate them is exposure to
sudden changes in the major elements and crucial determinants of one's
established position in the world ....
Michelman, supra note 17, at 1112-13 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Mr. Justice
Brennan: A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 296, 306
(1980)).
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described above show how this lack of stability is worsened by
abusive eminent domain and relocation practices.
2. Why Try To Preserve a "Ghetto?"
Neither of these proposals to empower residents of urban
communities would be restricted to "so-called" blighted
neighborhoods. Indeed, the prospect of dispensing with the
dubious process of blight determination makes the community
governance approach to land assembly all the more attractive.
Yet, impoverished communities have the most to gain, or lose, in
the struggle over the role of eminent domain in urban
redevelopment. 28 3  Against the backdrop of mounting social
science evidence denouncing geographic concentrations of
poverty,28 4 it would seem that urban redevelopment of the
privately owned slum housing should follow the lead of the
HOPE VI program and disperse poor people rather than facilitate
their cohesiveness.
In response, I would point out that giving neighborhood
residents a true choice as to whether or not they wish to leave
their communities is not incompatible with deconcentrating
poverty. Despite the popular understanding of the "teeming
slum," most severely deteriorated neighborhoods are actually
undercrowded, overwhelmed by vacant buildings and land.28 5
Even if the city experts and the resident homeowners approve a
plan that provides replacement housing for all existing residents,
there will typically be plenty of real estate to establish a mix of
incomes in the new neighborhood. Planners concerned about the
marketability of the new community, however, may seek and
receive homestead community consent to a plan that has less
lower-income housing. The alienability of each resident's right to
return can facilitate permanent relocation out of the
283 See Anderson, supra note 279, at 494-95; McFarlane, supra note 242, at
869-70.
284 See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE
AMERICAN CITY 193-94 (Russel Sage Found. 1997) (noting that geographical, social
and economic segregation is the cause of neighborhood poverty).
285 For example, the planned acquisition of 3300 properties in a deteriorated
residential neighborhood in East Baltimore was estimated to require the
displacement of approximately 300 owner occupied households and 500 renters. Eric
Siegel, East-side Biotech Details Unveiled Directors, Compensation for Those Who
Must Move To Be Announced Today, BALT. SUN, Apr. 15, 2002, at IA; see also Eric
Siegel, Biotech Park Moves Ahead, BALT. SUN, Apr. 23, 2002, at 1A.
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neighborhood, but will do so in a way that respects families'
choices as to where they wish to live.
CONCLUSION
Both the Homestead Community Consent and the
Community Resident Protection processes require that
redevelopment officials deal with residents' shared concerns. If
the redevelopment agency works with neighborhood residents to
forge a plan that responds to their needs and expresses their
visions of community, then the land assembly will be approved.
The owners of homestead rights will release their holds on their
individual properties without dissolving their relationship with
either the neighborhood land or one another. The more the
redevelopment plan places the agency's other goals above the
interests of the residents and the small businesses and newer
residents they care about, the greater the compensation the
agency will need to offer.
Few federal programs have ever begun with more optimism
and acclaim than urban renewal did more than half a century
ago. 28 6 The use of eminent domain in urban redevelopment to
overcome the twin problems of anticommons and holdouts did,
and still does, make sense. Urban renewal, however, failed to
differentiate between what money could buy and what it could
not buy. Residents whose lives, as they knew them, were
threatened by urban renewal rose up and ended it.287 Although
memories of those struggles have begun to fade, the Supreme
Court's recent Kelo decision has rekindled public concern over
eminent domain abuse.288 Those committed to true community
development should seize the opportunity this popular backlash
presents. Resident empowerment in the redevelopment process
will strengthen older communities and attract a varied array of
people and businesses to return to America's urban centers the
286 James Q. Wilson, Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban
Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 407 (James Q.
Wilson ed., MIT Press 1966).
287 See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 123, at 54.
288 See, e.g., Craig Gilbert, Public Use Ruling has Political Backlash,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2005, at Al ("The ruling managed to strike nerves
across the populist spectrum, stoking conservative suspicion of government, liberal
suspicion of corporate interests and unfettered development, and fear among the
urban poor of displacement.").
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vital diversity which has been both their lifeblood and their most
important contribution to world culture.
